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INTRODUCTION

Deeply rooted in this nation's foundation is the concept that "a man's
house is his castle,"' the use of which he should be free to restrict through
freedom of contract. 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that
"the public policy of this state and this nation favors the fullest liberty of
contract and the widest latitude possible in the disposition of one's property."3 The ability to maintain ownership of, and control over, property is
consistent with the American dream: "Owning a home of one's own has
always epitomized the American dream. More than simply embodying the
notion of having 'one's castle,' it represents the sense of freedom and selfdetermination emblematic of our national character."4 The realization of this
dream necessarily comes at the expense of certain freedoms associated with
property ownership and the ability to restrict its use.
In modern America, and quite notably in Florida, the exercise of property use restriction is most evident in the common-interest community
7
(CIC). 6 A CIC is often governed by a mandatory association commonly

1. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 162
(London, Bookfellers in Fleet-Street & Holborn 1669); see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 390 (1914) ("The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle,' is made a part of our
constitutional law ... and has always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen." (quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1871))).
2. See Joseph William Singer, Essay, DemocraticEstates: PropertyLaw in a Free and
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1009, 1024 (2009) (discussing freedom of contract
and disposition in the context of real property law).
3. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Watson, 65 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1953) (en banc).
4. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1296 (Cal. 1994) (in bank)
(Arabian, J., dissenting).
5. See infra Part IV.A-B.
6. The Restatement refers to residential communities as "common-interest communities":
A "common-interest community" is a real-estate development or neighborhood in which individually owned lots or units are burdened by a servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot

be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal
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known as the community association.' This private entity is charged with
enforcing the community's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs)9 while retaining the power to promulgate new rules and regulations.'o Armed with the power of legal enforcement, community associations can compel compliance with private land use restrictions recorded in
the community's CC&Rs, subject to constitutional, statutory, and public policy limitations."
Issues often arise when homeowners challenge the validity of these
covenants. As private entities, community associations are not bound to
comport with the protections and limitations of the Constitution-either Federal or State-absent state action.12 Consequently, restrictive covenants 3
(1) to pay for the use of, or contribute to the maintenance of, property held or enjoyed in common by the individual owners, or
(2) to pay dues or assessments to an association that provides services or facilities to the common property or to the individually owned property, or that enforces other servitudes burdening the property in the development or neighborhood.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8 (2000).
7. FLA. STAT. § 720.301(9) (2011). These associations

are "mandatory" because membership is a condition of purchasing a parcel in a CIC governed by an association. Id.
8.

This article refers to the private associations that govern CICs as "community asso-

ciations," as this term is recognized by Florida Statutes and Florida courts. See id. §
468.43 1(1); Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 463 (Fla. 2002).
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 6.2 (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1998). The Restatement refers to the declaration of CC&Rs as "governing documents," which
it defines as "the declaration and other documents, such as the articles of incorporation or
articles of association, bylaws, and rules and regulations, that govern the operation of a common-interest association, or determine the rights and obligations of the members of the common-interest community." Id.
10. See infra Part II.B.l.
I1. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
12. Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions . . . On Free
Speech? First Amendment Rights in Common-Interest Communities, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 739, 744 (2006). Through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, much of the Bill of Rights has been selectively incorporated to apply to

the states. Id. However, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action. Id. Therefore, "in order for [the conduct of] a [community association], a private actor, to be held to
constitutional standards, a court would need to determine that [its conduct] was in fact . . .
state act[ion]." Id. See infra Part V for a more elaborate discussion of state action and the
tests employed.
13. A restrictive covenant is "[a] private agreement, usu[ally] in a deed or lease, that
restricts the use or occupancy of real property, esp[ecially] by specifying lot sizes, building
lines, architectural styles, and the uses to which the property may be put." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 421 (9th ed. 2009). It is a type of real covenant and is a subset of the larger

category of "servitudes," which is defined as "[an encumbrance consisting in a right to the
limited use of a piece of land or other immovable property without the possession of it." Id. at

1492. This article refers to land use restrictions primarily as "restrictive covenants" because it

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 6

558

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

recorded in a community's CC&Rs may, and often do, abridge certain constitutional guarantees otherwise enjoyed relatively unfettered under the regime of a local or state government. 14 Despite the negative connotation associated with the notion of contracting away one's constitutional rights, these
restrictions are often necessary to support the interests of homeowners who
purchase property governed by a community association with the prospect
that the development scheme and other aesthetic" and practical "vested expectations" will be protected.16 This article will analyze these issues and
conclude that the importance of one's ability to covenant to mutually restrict
the use of property in a CIC is an important freedom and a voluntary choice
that should not be abridged by characterizing the conduct of community associations as state action.17
In reaching this conclusion, a systematic approach will be presented.
Part II of this article will discuss the rapid growth of community associations
and their role in the CIC while focusing on the voluntary nature of membership. It will focus primarily on Florida due to the pervasive presence of
community associations in its real property landscape and their explosive
growth that has outpaced the country's average over the past few decades.' 8
Its scope will be limited to Florida's relatively young homeowners' associafocuses on the manner in which a property owner may restrict, or limit, the use of his or her
property.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism,
and Other Failures of Legal Theory in ResidentialAssociations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L.
203, 205 (1992). Examples of aesthetic controls are "set-back requirements and architectural
standards." Id.; Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 838
(describing aesthetic values "as limits on paint color, yard art, structural changes, fences,
building materials, and the like"); see infra Part III.
16. Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Changing the Rules: Should Courts Limit the Power of
Common Interest Communities to Alter Unit Owners' Privileges in the Face of Vested Expectations?, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1081, 1082, 1126 (1998) (discussing the importance of
protecting the homeowner's vested expectations-subject to "the balance of community values and concerns of individual freedom"-of her property governed by a community association, while tolerating reasonable change as a necessary aspect of the complex, evolving nature
of community associations).
17. See infra Part VI. While some commentators refer to the state action inquiry as seeking to discern whether the entity itself is a state actor, that characterization is largely misplaced because the inquiry actually seeks to determine whether "the specific conduct of which
the plaintiff complains" is "unconstitutional conduct [that] is fairly attributable to the State."
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
18. See infra Part II.A; see also EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA:
HOMEOWNER
AssocIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 11 (1994) (most community association governed CICs "are concentrated in the sunbelt states, including Florida").
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tion law." Part III of this article will discuss the private land use control
mechanisms, the types of restrictive covenants that commonly burden property in CICs, and the desirable nature of many of these restrictions as well as
some detrimental consequences. Part IV of this article will discuss the interplay between the freedom to contract and the right to restrict one's property
use rights and rights in other contexts. Part V will analyze Florida's case law
on homeowners' associations and the state action doctrine. It will attempt to
reconcile the holdings and extract from these cases the state action tests employed by the various Florida courts. It will then apply these tests to the
characteristics of homeowners' associations and distinguish them from municipalities. It will illustrate how characterizing homeowners' associations
as "quasi-governmental" entities would jeopardize the ability of homeowners' and community associations alike to impose and enforce such restrictions on the use of property located within a CIC. Part VI of this article will
conclude that the property owner's freedom to contract outweighs the negligible loss of constitutional rights and that the conduct of private community
associations are not, and should not be, considered state action.
II.

COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PROLIFERATION, ROLE, AND
VOLUNTARY CHOICE

The importance of this issue is underscored by the dramatic increase in
the number of residential communities governed by community associations.20 The consequence of this trend concerns the prospective homeowner's autonomy: a transaction involving real property-burdened by use
restrictions and subject to others' property rights-that is the product of "voluntary market transactions." 2 1 The role community associations play helps

19.

Florida's condominium law, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this article,

has had more years to develop. DEP'T OF Bus. & PROF'L REGULATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE 3 (2004) [hereinafter HOA TASK FORCE], available

at http://www.ccfj.net/DBPRTFfinalreport.pdf. For example, condominium associations are
subject to regulatory oversight, more in-depth statutory regulation, and more defined unit
owner protections. See id. Additionally, statutory recognition and governance of homeowners' associations in Florida was not codified until 1992. Id. By contrast, Florida's condominium law was codified in 1963. Russell McCaughan, The Florida Condominium Act Applied,
17 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1964).
20.

See Frank Rathbun, Industry Data, COMMUNITY Ass'Ns INST., http://www.caionline.

org/info/research/pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
21. Gerald Korngold, Resolving the IntergenerationalConflicts of Real Property Law:
Preserving Free Markets and PersonalAutonomy for Future Generations,56 AM. U. L. REV.
1525, 1543 (2007); see infra Part II.C.
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protect the CIC homeowner's investment and expectations following these
transactions. 2 2
A.

Proliferationin the United States & Florida

Included under the community association umbrella are homeowners'
associations, condominium associations, cooperatives, and other associations
that govern planned communities. Over the past four decades, the number
of community associations nationwide has grown exponentially. 24 From
representing a modest 10,000 communities, which encompassed 701,000
housing units and housed 2.1 million residents in 1970, the number of community associations has skyrocketed to governing 309,600 communities of
24.8 million housing units and 62 million residents.25 Presently, one in five
Americans lives in a CIC governed by a community association.26 Just as
significantly, close to one in five housing units in the United States is governed by a community association. 27 The proportion of community association governed housing units to the total number of housing units in the United States has increased significantly over the past decade.28
While these nationwide statistics are substantial, their magnitude is surpassed by Florida's real property market and its affinity for community associations.29 However, calculating the number of community associations in
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. Rathbun, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.; American FactFinder: 2010 U.S. Profile of General Populationand Housing
Characteristics,U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter 2010 U.S. Profile of General Population
and Housing Characteristics], http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?pid=DEC 10_DPDPDPI&prodType=table (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
There are 62 million residents living in association-governed communities. Rathbun, supra
note 20. Considering the population of the United States was approximately 308.75 million as
of 2010, the result is one in five Americans living in a community governed by a community
association. See 2010 U.S. Profile of GeneralPopulationand Housing Characteristics,supra.
27. There are 24.8 million housing units represented by community associations.
Rathbum, supra note 20. This accounts for almost one-fifth of the 131.7 million housing units
in the United States. See 2010 U.S. Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics, supra note 26.
28. Rathbun, supra note 20; 2010 U.S. Profile of GeneralPopulation and Housing Characteristics, supra note 26; UNITED STATES PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERIsncs: 2000, US CENSUS BUREAU 1 (2000), http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/01
000.pdf. In 2000, there were 115.9 million housing units in the United States, and only 17.8
million of them were represented by community associations. Rathbun, supra note 20;
UNITED STATES PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000, supra.
29. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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Florida is more difficult than it would appear. Although homeowners' associations are required by Florida law to file articles of incorporation with the
Division of Corporations in the Department of State,30 "[t]he number of
homeowners' associations . .. in Florida is [largely] unknown." 3 This uncertainty is the result of several factors. First, it is difficult to distinguish
chapter 720 corporations, which are homeowners' associations, from other
not-for-profit entities registered with the Division of Corporation's database.32 Second, homeowners' associations are not required by Florida law to
present any significant data to the Division of Corporations that would assist
in calculating their numbers. 33 Finally, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR) does not require homeowners' associations to
submit projected development plans that would indicate their homeowners'
association status or provide the number of housing units within their developments.'
Notwithstanding this difficulty, estimates place the number of Florida
homeowners' associations in the range of 14,30035 to 27,000,36 with private
Combined with
industry research statistics falling within this spectrum.
Florida's 20,000 condominium associations, 38 a modest estimate of commu30. FLA. STAT. § 617.0203 (2011); PETER M. DUNBAR & CHARLES F. DUDLEY, THE LAW
OF FLORIDA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 10 (7th ed. 2007).
31. COMM. ON REGULATED INDUS., REP. No. 2008-148, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION FOR HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS 5 (2007), available at http://archive.flsenate.
gov/data/Publications/2008/Senate/reports/interimjreports/pdf/2008-148rilong.pdf.
32. Compare id., with OFFICE OF PROGRAM POL'Y ANALYSIS & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY,
REP. No. 10-20, LIMITED DATA IS AVAILABLE REGARDING NUMBER OF MANDATORY
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS; OrTIONS EXIST FOR INFORMATION GATHERING AND STATE
10-20], available at
OVERSIGHT 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter OPPAGA REP. No.
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/ I020rpt.pdf.
33. OPPAGA REP. No. 10-20, supra note 32, at 3.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.; COMM. ON REGULATED INDUS., supra note 31, at 6.
See 2011 2nd Qtr Florida Community Association Reference Directories,

SUNSHINELIST.COM, https://www.sunshinelist.com/201 I Q2-directories.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2012) (estimating that there are about 16,237 homeowners' associations in Florida by
analyzing association filings).
38. COMM. ON REGULATED INDUS., supra note 31, at 6. Other sources estimate a higher
figure. For example, private industry research estimates that there are 22,320 condominium

associations in Florida. See 2011 2nd Qtr Florida Community Association Reference Directories, supra note 37. An analysis of Florida's DBPR yields a total of 26,773 condominium
associations licensed with the DBPR. See Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile
Homes, FLA. DEP'T OF BUS. & PROF'L REG., http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/sto
/file.download/Iscdownload.shtml (follow "North Florida Counties" hyperlink, "Central
Florida East Counties" hyperlink, "Central Florida West Counties" hyperlink, "Dade and
Monroe Counties" hyperlink, and "Broward and Palm Beach Counties" hyperlink and add
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nity associations in Florida exceeds 40,000. Limiting the scope solely to
homeowners' associations nevertheless produces impressive results: In a
state of 18.8 million people,39 Florida's estimated 6 million homeowners'
association residents" means one in three Floridians lives in a community
governed by a homeowners' association.41 Outpacing the country's average
number of persons living under a community association, Florida is a prime
forum for this analysis. 4 2
The dramatic increase in Florida's population and housing compounds
Florida's population grew by approximately 15% over the last
issue.
this
43
decade. During the same period, the overall U.S. population growth was
9.7%," outpaced by Florida's population growth by about 5%.45 A similar

together the total number of entries) (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). A review of DBPR's data
spreadsheets reveals that the likely result of this higher statistic is the listing of multiple condominium building associations separately, despite being governed by the same master association. See id.
39. American FactFinder: 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing
Characteristics,U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, [hereinafter 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics],http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages
/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_DPDPDP1&ProdType=table (last visited Apr. 15,2012).
40. OPPAGA REP. No. 10-20, supra note 32, at 3.
41. Compare id., with 2010 FloridaProfile of General Populationand Housing Characteristics, supranote 39.
42. See David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities, Covenants, and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 179 (2003) (finding that "[t]he greatest proportion of
homeowner associations can be found in Florida, California, and Texas"); Steven Siegel, The
Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of Constitutional Rights in
Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 461, 469 (1998) (asserting that community associations "constitute nearly all new
residential development in . . . Florida"); Suarez, supra note 12, at 742-43 (finding that community associations are most common in a handful of states, including Florida); Karen Ellert
Pefia, Comment, Reining in Property Owners' Associations' Power: Texas's Need for a
Comprehensive Plan, 33 ST. MARY's L.J. 323, 328 (2002) (finding that community associations "account[] for nearly all new home developments in ... Florida").
43. Florida's population grew from just under 16 million in 2000 to almost 18.8 million
people in 2010. Compare FLORIDA CENSUS 2000 PROFILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (2002),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kprof00-fl.pdf, with 2010 FloridaProfile of General
Populationand Housing Characteristics,supranote 39.
44. Compare UNITED STATES PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS:
2000, supra note 28, at 1, with 2010 U.S. Profileof General Populationand Housing Characteristics,supra note 26.
45. See FLORIDA CENSUS 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2; 2010 FloridaProfile of General Population and Housing Characteristics,supra note 39; UNITED STATES PROFILE OF
GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000, supra note 28, at 1; 2010 U.S. Profile of
General Populationand Housing Characteristics,supra note 26.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss3/6

8

Levine: This is my Castle: On Balance, the Freedom of Contract Outweighs

2012]1

THIS IS MY CASTLE

563

housing trend has emerged." In 2010, the total number of housing units in
Florida was just shy of 9 million, 4 7 reflecting an 18.9% increase in total housing units in just ten years,48 and outpacing the 15% increase in population.4 9
Because the average household and family size remained virtually unchanged between 2000 and 201 0,50 the housing boom during the earlier part
of the decade"' is likely the cause of Florida's housing market growing at a
greater pace than its growth in population. This is supported by the disparity
between Florida's 17.5% vacant housing unit rate5 2 and the U.S. average
vacant housing unit rate of 11.4%.53
Considering most of Florida's new development is governed by community associations, 54 this tremendous growth in housing and the corresponding increase in population signifies that a large portion of prospective
homeowners will be faced with the decision of whether to purchase in a
community governed by an association. While a housing market recovery in
Florida may still be on the distant horizon, the glut in housing inventory, 5 at
least some of which is concentrated in community associations, will eventually find its way into the hands of homeowners faced with a familiar choice:
Restrict one's use of his or her property and enjoy the benefits of a community association56 or depend exclusively on a local municipality or city for the
provision of such services.
46. See FLORIDA CENSUs 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2; 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics,supra note 39; UNITED STATES PROFILE OF
GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000, supra note 28, at 1; 2010 U.S. Profile of
General Populationand Housing Characteristics,supra note 26.
47. 2010 Florida Profile of GeneralPopulation and Housing Characteristics,supra note
39.
48. Compare id., with FLORIDA CENSus 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2. In 2000, there
were 7.3 million housing units in Florida. FLORIDA CENSus 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2.
49. Compare id., with 2010 Florida Profile of General Populationand Housing Characteristics, supra note 39.
50. Compare 2010 Florida Profile of General Populationand Housing Characteristics,
supra note 39, with FLORIDA CENSUs 2000 PROFILE, supra note 43, at 2.
51. See Toluse Olorunnipa, South Florida Is More Diverse and Growing More Slowly,
Census Figures Show, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 17, 2011 (discussing Florida's 2000-2010 housing boom).
52. 2010 Florida Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics,supra note
39.
53. 2010 U.S. Profile of GeneralPopulationand Housing Characteristics,supra note 26.
54. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
55. See Les Christie, Shadow Inventory Threatens Housing Recovery, CNN MONEY (Jan.
20, 2011, 7:34 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/20/realestate/shadow-inventory-rise/
index.htm.
56. See infra Parts 1I.B, III.A.I.a.
57. See infra Parts II.B, III.A.2.
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The Role of the Community Association

B.

While CICs have become a common fixture in Florida, their legal characteristics are quite unique. These include "common ownership of property, mandatory membership in the [community] association, and the requirement of living under a private regime of restrictive covenants enforced
by fellow residents."59 Aimed at "promot[ing] the community concept and
protect[ing] the community's property values,"60 community associations
manage and maintain CIC facilities "rang[ing] from park-like open spaces to
streets, lighting, water and sewer facilities and recreational facilities." 61 Enforcement of the community's CC&Rs is among their primary role, though
their overarching purpose serves to protect CIC homeowners' investments
and expectations.62 While varying in size and complexity,63 the basic structure of community associations remains relatively similar, and it will be discussed in the context of the Florida homeowners' association-the focus of
this article.
1.

An Introduction to the Florida Homeowners' Association

As a starting point, the basic definition of the homeowners' association
sheds light on its basic structure. Florida defines a "homeowners' association" as:
a Florida corporation responsible for the operation of a community
or a mobile home subdivision in which the voting membership is
made up of parcel owners or their agents, or a combination thereof,
and in which membership is a mandatory condition of parcel ownership, and which is authorized to impose assessments that, if unpaid, may become a lien on the parcel. 4
However, this definition is largely inadequate in delineating the purpose
and nature of the Florida homeowners' association and its role in the residen-

58.

MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at I1, 19-20.
59. Id. at 19.
60. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 2.
61. James L. Winokur, CriticalAssessment: The FinancialRole of Community Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1135, 1139 (1998).
62. Brower, supra note 15, at 205-06.
63. WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER AssocIATION PRACTICE:
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 99 (3d ed. 2000).
64. FLA. STAT. § 720.301(9) (2011).
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tial community. Created by the community's CC&Rs,65 the Florida homeowners' association is a corporation, primarily not-for-profit," charged with
operating the community. 7 It is statutorily authorized "to enforce the covenants and restrictions contained in the governing documents of the community." 6 8 The community includes all property owned by residents individually and "common areas owned or leased by the [homeowners'] association,"
and all property within the community is bound by these CC&Rs.69 Consequently, all current and future owners in the community are bound by them.70
The homeowners' association's ability to provide beneficial services
and to protect homeowners' investments necessarily entails a cost for homeowners beyond forgoing certain land use rights." Accordingly, homeowners' associations impose assessments 72 to each parcel owner, pro rata, to
share the costs of the provision of services and the maintenance of the common areas. 73 In order to keep up with evolving societal and residential needs,
homeowners' associations often need to implement change. 74 Empowered by
its bylaws,' 5 it may promulgate new rules and regulations. 7 6 However, this
power is not absolute: While the CIC's recorded CC&Rs "are clothed with a
very strong presumption of validity,"77 subsequent rules and regulations
adopted by the board of directors are subject to the standard of reasonable65. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 5.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id. at 4.
70. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 7-8, 90. These restrictive covenants are said
to "'run[] with the land' as a set of permanent restrictions governing [the community's] use."
Id. at 7.
71. See id. at 2-3.
72. Florida defines "assessment" as
a sum or sums of money payable to the association, to the developer or other owner of common areas, or to recreational facilities and other properties serving the parcels by the owners of
one or more parcels as authorized in the governing documents, which if not paid by the owner
of a parcel, can result in a lien against the parcel.
FLA. STAT. § 720.301(1).
73. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 6.
74. Zachary M. Rawling, Reevaluating Leasing Restrictions in Community Associations:
Rejecting Reasonableness in Favor of Consent, 5 J.L. EcON. & POt'Y 225, 230 (2009)
("[Community] governance must be responsive to the evolving preferences of property owners" in order "[t]o accommodate the changing needs of a community.").
75. The bylaws of a homeowners' association, as defined in its articles of incorporation,
establish its basic structure, procedures, and rule-making abilities. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, Supra
note 30, at 10-11.
76. Id. at I1.
77. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
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ness.7 8 Additionally, the business judgment rule 79 applies to the boards of
Florida corporations; each director must perform his or her duties in good
faith as would a reasonable prudent person given the circumstances, and in a
manner reasonably in the best interests of the corporation.80 Each director
also has a fiduciary duty to the residents of the CIC governed by the homeowners' association.8 '
For all but the smallest CICs, homeowners' associations are a necessary
and desirable means of managing property held in common amongst homeowners. 82 In Florida, homeowners' associations are charged with the significant responsibility of maintaining facilities and managing the community in
a manner residents may not experience in an ungoverned community." Indeed, Florida recognizes the importance of these associations and their potential benefits to homeowners: In enacting chapter 720, Florida Statutes,
the legislature indicated the desire "that homeowners associations not be
subject[] to extensive state regulation"" in order "to protect the rights of
property owners and association members without unduly impairing the association's ability to perform its functions." 85
C.

The Voluntary Nature of MandatoryAssociation Membership

Much ink has been spilled debating the consensual nature of mandatory
association membership.86 As a general consensus of these opposing views,
78. Id. at 639-40 (distinguishing CC&Rs which are presumptively valid from boardpromulgated regulations which are restrained by the reasonableness standard); DUNBAR &
DUDLEY, supra note 30, at I1-12, 88.
79. "The business judgment rule is a principle of substantive corporate law that presumes
a corporate director has acted in good faith." James F. Carroll, The Business Judgment Rule in
Florida-onPaperand in the Trenches, 80 FLA. B.J. 55, 55 (2006).
80. FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(1) (2011).
81. Id. § 720.303(1); DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 40-41.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.3 cmt. a. (2000).
83. See DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 2.
84. OPPAGA REP. No. 10-20, supra note 32, at 3 & n.9.
85. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 3.
86. See Brower, supra note 15, at 222, 246-47 (discussing the essential premise of community association membership as fully voluntary, subject to arguments of buyer ignorance
and the inability to understand covenanting documents); Mark Cantora, Increasing Freedom
by Restricting Speech: Why the FirstAmendment Does Not and Should Not Apply in Common
Interest Communities, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 409, 424 (2011) (characterizing the voluntary relinquishment of some constitutional rights in exchange for the expansion of other benefits as "the
very essence of democratic freedom."); Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1523 (1982) ("[M]embership in a private organization is wholly voluntary."); Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543-44 (discussing the voluntary nature of
"[c]onsensual transfers of partial interests" in land); Randolph, Jr., supra note 16, at 1125
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the dividing line seems to be drawn between accepting the notion that constructive notice equates to one's voluntary choice of restricting property
use, and the view that consent cannot be voluntary where homeowners lack
bargaining power" to negotiate these restrictive covenants or lack the faculties to understand them or even be cognizant of their existence.89
However, the decision to purchase in a CIC governed by a homeowners' association is not the Hobson's choice 90 that some of these commentators have alleged.9 ' Granted, it might often be the case that many homeowners, as laymen, do not appreciate the nature of these restrictions or the extent
to which they might limit their constitutional rights.92 It might also be the
case that the potential homebuyer might not be aware of the restrictions he or
she is buying into. 93 Nevertheless, studies suggest that "87% of residents
were told the home they were considering was part of a community association." 94 For those who are not, the law in Florida holds that ownership of a
(explaining that the original community association agreement is the product of informed
decision making). But see Laura Coon, Sign Restrictions in Residential Communities: Does
the First Amendment Stop at the Gate?, 19 CoMM. LAW. 24, 24 (2001) ("Prospective homeowners may agree to such restrictions by choosing to live in such communities, but their
choice is often made in the face of limited housing options."); MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at
135 (referring to community associations as "ostensibly voluntary in membership."); Siegel,
supra note 42, at 469 (Because of the dominance of community associations and their steady
increase in proliferation, "the notion of individual homebuyer autonomy, and especially individual homebuyer consent to the complex and comprehensive [CIC] servitude regime, is
illusory.").
87. See, e.g., Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302, 310-12 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1966) (discussing the concept of "constructive notice" and how purchasing property subject to
a recorded declaration of CC&Rs constitutes such notice, regardless of whether an immediate
deed contains the restrictions contained in the recorded declaration).
88. See Brian Jason Fleming, Note, Regulation of PoliticalSigns in Private Homeowner
Associations: A New Approach, 59 VAND. L. REV. 571, 586 (2006).
89. Margaret Farrand Saxton, Comment, Protecting the Marketplace of Ideas: Access for
Solicitors in Common Interest Communities, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2004). Some
governing documents are exceedingly complex and often cannot be understood by the average
homeowner. Id. While it is the responsibility of the seller to disclose the existence of these
documents, it is not required that the buyer actually looks at or understands them. See Hagan,
186 So. 2d at 310-12; DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 8.
90. A "Hobson's choice" is "[a]n election by compulsion or without freedom of choice; a
choice without an alternative." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 561 (3d ed. 1969).
91. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 74; Siegel, supra note 42 at 469.
92. See Brower, supra note 15, at 246-47. "[E]mpirical evidence [suggests] that most
purchasers neither read nor understand [governing] documents." Id.
93. Id. at 246-48.
94. CmTY. Ass'NS INST., WHAT Do AMERICANS SAY ABOUT THEIR OWN COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONs 6 (2009), available at http://www.caionline.org/info/researchlDocuments/
nationalresearch_2009.pdf.
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parcel burdened by a recorded declaration of restrictive covenants imputes
upon the owner knowledge of such restrictions. 95 Certainly there is a reason
the law presumes constructive knowledge of recorded CC&Rs: It is impossible to ascertain whether someone is genuinely unaware of a restrictive covenant.96 Unfortunately, candor is not a defining feature of human nature.
Therefore, due diligence is rewarded, 97 whereas the imprudent proceeds at
his or her peril. To allow a homeowner to successfully challenge the validity
of a restrictive covenant on the basis he or she does not understand the nature
or existence of the restriction would be to reward his or her ignorance.
The imputation of knowledge of restrictive covenants supports sound
public policy. 98 By presuming homeowners are aware of their property rights
and abridgments thereof, the potential detriment the lack of knowledge of
restrictive covenants may have upon their rights and ability to use their property should serve as an incentive for homeowners-and citizens in generalto be more cognizant of their rights. 99 Although some argue that encouraging
residents' awareness and education of their property rights is insufficient to
protect their interests, the mutually beneficial nature of the covenantrestricted CIC compensates for this, as it is designed to promote the overall
interests of its residents."
Subscription to the restrictive covenants burdening a parcel in a CIC is
the product of a voluntary market decision, just as the creation of these restrictions is the product of free choice tempered by sophisticated, informed
decision-making and market considerations.' 0' As one scholar noted, "the
original association agreement was the result of a true market decision by
parties with the necessary knowledge and sophistication to make an informed

95. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 8, 88. Florida's Marketable Record Title Act
protects a homeowners' association's declaration of CC&Rs from circumvention by an uninformed homeowner by nevertheless binding his or her property by its restrictive covenants
through the doctrine of constructive notice. FLA. STAT. §§ 712.02-.03 (2011).
96. Korngold, supra note 21, at 1546. This is because unlike constructive notice, which
is imputed, actual notice is "[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1164 (9th ed. 2009).
97. The diligent homebuyer, apprised of all restrictions burdening his or her property, is
rewarded in the sense that he or she has the ability to make an informed decision in selecting a
parcel whose characteristics suit his or her tastes and preferences. Korngold, supra note 21, at
1545.
98. Cantora, supra note 86, at 423-24.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 424.
101. See Randolph, Jr., supra note 16, at 1125; see also Fennell, supra note 15, at 832
("[Community associations] are often viewed as representing a laudable shift in the direction
of consumer choice.").

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss3/6

14

Levine: This is my Castle: On Balance, the Freedom of Contract Outweighs

20121

THIS IS MY CASTLE

569

choice." 02 It was the intention of the original drafters of these restrictive
covenants to maintain the image and community they desired to build, crafted to embrace societal factors and market considerations as a reflection of
the desired development scheme.103 Just as those before them desired to
achieve, new purchasers, while perhaps unaware of particular restrictions,
choose to be a part of this community and reap the benefits these restrictions
affect through compliance." This voluntary choice of communal belonging
is accompanied by the use restrictions necessary to achieve and perpetuate
the desired development scheme.'0o
While free, unrestricted use of property is generally favored,'0 effect is
given to the original intent of the developer or homeowners who desire to
mutually restrict the use of property in order to achieve a development
scheme that will continue for years to come. 0 7 For those potential homeowners seeking to purchase, whether they wish to buy into this development
scheme or seek housing unburdened by restrictive covenants, they nevertheless retain their freedom of choice. 08 Some might argue, and with merit, that
the proliferation of homeowners' associations and community associations in
general leaves prospective homeowners with fewer options.'" Compounded
by the fact that one in five Americans, and more significantly, one in three
Floridians, lives in a community association,"o it would seem that the decision has already been made for many of these consumers. Despite the assertion that the lack of available housing unburdened by restrictive covenants
may result in involuntary acquiescence to those covenants,"' these prospective buyers are not bereft of their freedom to choose their homesteads. It is
just as possible that the lack of available housing unburdened by restrictive
102. Randolph, Jr., supra note 16, at 1125.
103. Brower, supra note 15, at 205-06.
104. Id. at 224 ("Accordingly, common interest developments cannot protect residents'
investments and socially based preferences unless members are assured that their choices and
agreements will confine themselves and others, both now and in the future.").
105. Id. at223-25.
106. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Watson, 65 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1953) (en banc).
107. Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302, 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
("Where the owner of a tract of land subdivides it and sells distinct parcels thereof to separate
grantees, imposing restrictions on its use pursuant to a general plan of development or improvement, such restrictions may be enforced by any grantee against any other grantee . . .
108. See Fennell, supra note 15, at 832; see also Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1520.
109. Brower, supra note 15, at 248 (discussing the scarcity of unrestricted housing as a
result of the great increase in number of CICs); Fennell, supra note 15, at 829 ("In many parts
of the country today, a homebuyer who wishes to purchase a new home is likely to find that
home in a private development governed by a homeowners association.").
110. See discussion supra Part II.A.
111. See Brower, supra note 15, at 248.
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covenants is the product of a housing market modeled after consumer demand and social preference, leaving immaterial their non-acquiescence to
those specific restrictions of whose effect they desire to be a part anyway.1 12
The voluntary nature of mandatory homeowners' association membership is more apparent when distinguished from the contrary, involuntary nature of city or municipality membership." 3 A homeowner acquires membership in a homeowners' association by purchasing a parcel of land in a CIC
governed by one." 4 By contrast, "statutory procedures for incorporating a
new city invariably authorize a majority (perhaps only concurrent or extraordinary majorities) to coerce involuntary minorities to join their organization.""' While the decision of which city or municipality will become their
domicile may be a voluntary choice, residents do not have the same freedom
of choice they have regarding homeowners' association membership." 6 Residents can choose to forego association membership by moving into a community not governed by one, but they cannot avoid membership in a city or
municipality, no matter where they live.' '7 This comparison leads into the
premise, discussed later, that homeowners' associations should not be likened to municipalities." 8
III. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND FLORIDA'S HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION

A short drive through the traditional CIC should make apparent the
need for, and impact of, restrictive covenants. From the uniformity in structural aesthetics" 9 to the well-manicured common areas, the system of restrictive covenants is evident.12 0 Beginning in the early twentieth century, restrictive covenants emerged as developers' primary means of implementing their
subdivision plans.12' By recording a master declaration of CC&Rs, the de112. See id. at 239 (Under a "market theory of consent," which refers to the collective
choice of societal values, "people acknowledge and appreciate the risks and advantages of
[community] association[s] . . . when they shop for family residences. Thus, by definition,
their decision to purchase in a [CIC] means that they have determined they are better off, or at
least no worse off, in a community with those restrictions than in one without them.").
113. See Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1520.
114. See supra text accompanying note 64.
115. Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1523.
116. Id. at 1520.
117. See id.
118. See infra Part V.B.
119. See Fennell, supra note 15, at 838.
120. See id. at 830.
121. McKENZIE, supra note 18, at 36.
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veloper restricts the use each future parcel owner can make of his or her
property in order to preserve the community concept.12 2 At first glance, the
most noticeable objects for preservation are aesthetic values, where restrictive covenants impose "limits on paint color, yard art, structural changes,
fences, building materials, and the like."1 23 More covert are those covenants
obligating homeowners to pay assessments and those "providing for the operation, maintenance or management of the association or the property.""2
Through these various private land use controls, property owners can mutually restrict the use of property 25 that will bind present and future owners
alike.126 These restrictions, while limiting the use one can make of his or her
property, are often desirable.127 They can, however, have detrimental consequences for those who fail to educate themselves on the substance of the
restrictive covenants to which they subscribed when they purchased their
property.128 Overall, the entity responsible for enforcing these restrictive
covenants is a necessary device.

A.

CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, and the FloridaHomeowners'
Association

In recognizing the importance of voluntary consumer autonomy, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal held in Hidden HarbourEstates, Inc. v. Bas-

so, 129 that restrictions recorded in a declaration of CC&Rs "are clothed with a
very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed."' 30 This holding supports the policy underlying the voluntary nature of restrictive covenants."' It further held that these restrictions
"will not be invalidated absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in
122. See id.; Fennell, supra note 15, at 838.
123. Fennell, supra note 15, at 838.
124. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 88-89.
125. Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302, 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). Each
homeowner has the right to enforce these restrictions against one another. Id. A "restriction,"
in the real property context, is a "limitation . . . placed on the use or enjoyment of property."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (9th ed. 2009).
126. See DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 8 ("When covenants run with the land, a
person who assumes ownership of a parcel of the land also assumes ownership with the presumed knowledge of the covenants.").
127. See infra Part Ill.A.I.a.
128. See infra Part Ill.A.I.a.
129. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
130. Id. at 639.
131. See supra Part II.C.
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their application, in violation of public policy, or that they abrogate some
fundamental constitutional right.", 3 2 While some commentators have vividly
epitomized homeowners' associations as supreme arbiters having limitless
power and absolute authority to capriciously enact rules at a whim, 33 these
characterizations are misplaced and largely embellished.
The limitations on an association's board of directors is apparent in the
Basso decision: It distinguished a CIC's CC&Rs from those rules and regulations "promulgated by the association's board of directors,"'3 qualifying
the latter with the standard of "reasonableness," which confines the board's
rule-making discretion to those "reasonably related to the promotion of the
health, happiness and peace of mind of the unit owners." 35
Further protection from arbitrary or exceedinglyl36 unreasonable restrictions can be found in federal and state statutes.'13 For example, the Federal
Fair Housing Act (FHA), which applies to both state and private actorssuch as homeowners' associations-provides that "it shall be unlawful ...
[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin." 38 Additionally, Florida prohibits certain covenants that
give unilateral association decision making power to emancipated developers' 39 and preempts covenants that infringe upon a homeowner's right to fly
an American flag.'

132. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 640.
133. See Sharon L. Bush, Beware the Associations: How Homeowners' Associations
Control You and Infringe upon Your InalienableRights!!, 30 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2003)
(contending that homeowners' associations, whose "[elmotionally entrenched board members
... make up their own rules" while "wielding a big stick," control every aspect of homeowners' lives, likening them to "giant bulldozers that ravage the rights of homeowners"); Paula A.
Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust and Community: The Common Interest Community as Metaphor and Paradox,72 Mo. L. REV. 1111, 1130 (2007) (asserting that "homeowners association boards can devolve into mini-autocracies").
134. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 639.
135. Id. at 640; see also FLA. STAT. § 720.304(1) (2011) ('The entity or entities responsible for the operation of the common areas and recreational facilities may adopt reasonable
rules and regulations pertaining to the use of such common areas and recreational facilities.").
136. This qualifier is necessary, considering "a use restriction in a declaration ... may
have a certain degree of unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack in the courts." Basso,
393 So. 2d at 640 (emphasis omitted).
137. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 720.3075(l)(a).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
139. FLA. STAT. § 720.3075(l)(a).
140. Id. §§ 720.304(2)(a), .3075(3).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss3/6

18

Levine: This is my Castle: On Balance, the Freedom of Contract Outweighs

THIS IS MY CASTLE

2012]1

573

At the end of the day, the restrictions embodied in a community's
CC&Rs and the later promulgated rules and regulations serve the homeowners. Whether that service is to their benefit or detriment depends on many
factors, such as the complexity and nature of their community and its operations,141 the level of awareness and understanding homeowners have of the
restrictive covenants that burden their properties, and the zeal of the association's board of directors.142 But ultimately, the homeowners' association
charged with enforcing these CC&Rs, rules, and regulations is a necessary

vehicle. 14 3
1.
a.

Private Land Use Controls'" and the Enforcing Entity

Desirablefor Many, DetrimentalforSome: Perception is Through the
Lens of the Media

The ability to control the manner in which one's community functions
and appears is a useful device, not only in theory. As discussed, the desire
for uniformity and consistency is satisfied through imposition of private land
use controls and the subsequent enforcement thereof.14 5 The corollary benefits of these private land use controls, steadfastly enforced by a governing
entity, are numerous.146 In some communities, residents enjoy certain amenities and facilities, such as "a golf course, a swimming pool, tennis courts,
[and] a clubhouse." 47 Through economies of scale,'4 8 residents may enjoy

141. For example, the residents of an exclusive golf and country club community, which
would likely require a complex regime of restrictions and regulations in order to function, may
support the passing of more stringent rules, whereas the residents of a modest suburban community comprised of homes and insignificant common areas may support more relaxed measures. See Fennell, supra note 15, at 841-42. One commentator colorfully described a declaration of CC&Rs as "a fat package many pages long and full of elaborate restrictions that, taken
as a whole, dictate to a large extent the lifestyle of everybody in the project." McKENZIE,
supra note 18, at 21.
142. Restrictive covenants, rules, and regulations are worth no more than their ability to be
enforced. See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 133, at 1135 ("Under the standard CIC originating documents, a key mandate of [the] board[] [of directors] is to enforce the developerimposed servitudes scheme and to mete out penalties against homeowners who fail to comply.").
143. See infra Part III.A.2.
144. This article discusses private land use controls, such as restrictive covenants, as opposed to public controls, such as zoning ordinances, which are beyond the scope of this article.
145. Fennell, supra note 15, at 838.
146. See id. at 841-42.
147. Id.
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these amenities and facilities they would otherwise be unable to afford or
maintain.149 In addition to benefitting from a harmonized aesthetic and development scheme, 5 o homeowners in a CIC governed by a community association benefit from increased property values."' In fact, 70% of homeowners living in association-governed CICs believe their communities' rules
enhance their property values.152 Similarly, 71% of these residents rate their
experience living under the governance of these community associations as
positive.'53 Overall, this survey confirmed the following findings:
*

Residents are satisfied with their community associations.

*

Association board members strive to serve the best interests of
the community.

*

Community managers provide value and support to associations.

*

Association rules protect and enhance property values.

*

Homeowners value the return they get for their association assessments.

148. A production analogy is helpful here: "Economies of scale" is referred to as
"[s]avings achieved in the cost of production by larger enterprises because the cost of initial
investment can be defrayed across a greater number." Definition of: Economies of Scale,
GEOGRAPHY-DICTIONARY.ORG (2008), http://geography.geography-dictionary.org/GeographyDictionary/Economies ofScale. Similarly, in the community association, such costs may be
defrayed amongst numerous homeowners, thereby achieving an efficient provision of services
otherwise out of the financial reach of the average homeowner.
149. Fennell, supra note 15, at 842; see also Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543-44 (discussing the market efficiency of pooled resources to provide amenities for CIC residents).
150. See Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private Communities or Public Governments: "The State Will Make the Call", 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 509, 513 (1996).
151. Id.; Suarez, supra note 12, at 743; Lara Womack & Douglas Timmons, Homeowner
Associations: Are They Private Governments?, 29 REAL EsT. L.J. 322, 323 (2001). But see
Korngold, supra note 21, at 1544 (contending that use restrictions burdening a parcel might
decrease its value but that such loss is offset by the mutual nature of such restrictions binding
other lots in the community).
152. CMTY. Ass'Ns INST., supra note 94, at 5. By comparison, only 2% of homeowners
thought the rules harmed their property values, 2% were not sure, and 27% perceived no difference. Id.
153. Id. at 2. By contrast, only 12% of residents had a negative experience, and 17% were
neutral. Id.
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*

Residents do not want

communities.154

. . .

575

government intervention in their

This research suggests that homeowners are satisfied with the restrictive
covenants binding the use of their property and the association responsible
for enforcing them.'
Beyond those values ascertainable by survey, the historical development of CICs promoted certain ideals, still important today.'5 6 They "were
seen as serving important, then emerging and still valued social policiesprotection of the family home, fostering a positive communal setting for
families and children, efficiently offering recreation facilities at a shared
Some of the
cost, and use of democratic principles of self-governance."'
restrictions used to craft these CICs, and their place in Florida communities,
will now be discussed.
Some restrictive covenants concern the makeup of the community.'
Aesthetic policies such as building restrictions serve to protect the integrity
of the community's appearance and development scheme.'" 9 Examples of
structures and improvements that have been ordered removed by Florida
courts as not conforming to a community's CC&Rs include: "unauthorized
carports," porches,' decks,16 satellite dishes,16 67ham radio antennas,'" radio tower/antennas,165 docks,166 exterior awnings, sheds and similar struc154. Id.
155. CMTY. Ass'Ns INST., supra note 94, at 3.
156. Korngold, supra note 21, at 1571-72.
157. Id. at 1572.
158. See Brower, supra note 15, at 205.
159. See id.
160. Pelican Island Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Murphy, 554 So. 2d 1179, 1180, 1182 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
161. Europco Mgmt. Co. of Am. v. Smith, 572 So. 2d 963, 965, 968 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
162. Miami Lakes Civic Ass'n v. Encinosa, 699 So. 2d 271, 271, 273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
163. Killearn Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. Keever, 595 So. 2d 1019, 1020, 1022 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also Latera v. Isle at Mission Bay Homeowners Ass'n, 655 So. 2d
144, 144-45 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Esplanade Patio Homes Homeowners' Ass'n v.
Rolle, 613 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
164. Emerald Estates Cmty. Ass'n v. Gorodetzer, 819 So. 2d 190, 191, 195 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2002).
165. Brower v. Hubbard, 643 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
166. Johnson v. Tlush, 468 So. 2d 1023, 1024-25 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam); O'Brien v. Gale J. Apple, Inc., 253 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
167. Eastpointe Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Cohen, 505 So. 2d 518, 518, 521 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1987).
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ures,168 improper fencing,'69 concrete walls,1 70 an exterior wall plaque,17 ' and
a portion of a dwelling encroaching on a setback line'72 between parcels." 7
However, their enforcement depends on the existence of a recorded CC&R
regulating an aesthetic scheme.17 4 Indeed, one Florida court held that:
In the absence of an existing pattern or scheme of type of architecture which puts a prospective purchaser on notice that only one
kind of style will be allowed, either in the recorded restrictions or
de facto from the unified building scheme built on the subdivision,
[a homeowners' association] board does not have the power or
discretion to impose only one style over another, based purely on
"aesthetic concepts." 75
This limitation preserves homeowners' autonomy in deciding which architectural scheme they desire to buy into and ensures that an imprudent
board of directors will not be successful in enforcing arbitrarily-adopted
building or aesthetic restrictions 76 not contemplated by the community's
CC&Rs-the restrictions to which homeowners voluntarily acquiesced by
purchasing in the community. 177 Restricting aesthetic values, such as the
color residents can paint their houses and the materials used in additions or
repairs serves an important purpose: to avoid unsightly and devaluing consequences.' 78
The effect these aesthetic and architectural controls have on homeowners is not always favorable, and the association often gets a bad rap for enforcing them.' 79 Unfortunately, the media exposure given to homeowners'
168. McMillan v. Oaks of Spring Hill Homeowner's Ass'n, 754 So. 2d 160, 161-62 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
169. James v. Smith, 537 So. 2d 1074, 1075, 1078 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
170. Velickovich v. Ricci, 391 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
171. Lakeridge Greens Homeowners Ass'n v. Silberman, 765 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
172. Daniel v. May, 143 So. 2d 536, 537-38 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
173. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 107.
174. Young v. Tortoise Island Homeowner's Ass'n, 511 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1987).
175. Id. (footnotes omitted).
176. See, e.g., Voight v. Harbour Heights Improvement Ass'n, 218 So. 2d 803, 806 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (per curiam).
177. Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1523; see discussionsupra Part II.C.
178. See Fennell, supra note 15, at 843-44, 872 (discussing aesthetic values by analogy of
ugly yard art and the resulting aesthetic dismay and diminution of property value due to loss
of the community ambiance).
179. See, e.g., Callies et al., supra note 42, at 185 ("Increasingly, [homeowners'] associations are described as rigid, uninspired, and excessively concerned with compliance and con-
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associations is not normally cast in favorable light.'" The result is often an
over-dramatization of otherwise reasonable restrictions in homeowners' associations across the state, focusing on the specific peculiarities of the violating homeowner. 8 ' For example, a homeowner in an upscale subdivision in
Tampa, Florida neglected to consult his copy of his community's CC&Rs
before building a backyard tree house for his son.' 82 Because the tree house
was six feet taller than the restrictive covenants permitted, the homeowners'
association warned of its intentions to pursue legal action against the offending homeowner.183 This story would likely not have made it in a newspaper
save for one fact: The son for whom the tree house was built had leukemia.' The restriction undoubtedly served an aesthetic purpose to which this
homeowner subscribed, and the board cannot make an exception merely out
of compassion for the homeowner's unfortunate circumstances because such
an act could compromise its ability to enforce the restriction in the future."'
Similarly, in Sanford, Florida, a homeowner tragically lost his wife,
child, and home when a plane crashed into his house.186 The homeowner
rebuilt his house without architectural approval from his homeowners' association, and it turns out the location of the new house and materials used in

trol . . . as members balk at overzealous restrictiveness and rules that are perceived to be
heavy handed.").
180. See, e.g., CMTY. Ass'NS INST., supra note 94, at 3. Research suggests that anecdotal
reports provided by the media feed the negative connotation associated with homeowners'
associations:
Conflict makes headlines, and that's what most Americans read in newspapers and see on television about community associations. Unfortunately, there is little news in harmony. We
don't see stories about the tens of millions of homeowners who are satisfied and content in
their communities. We don't read many media profiles about association board members who
lead their associations quietly and effectively. We don't see stories about managers and other
professionals who provide invaluable guidance and support to their community association clients.
Id.
181. See Amy Herdy, It's Rules vs. Reason in Neighborhoods, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2000, at I B; Dave McDaniel, Sanford Plane Crash Victim Hits Rebuilding Snags,
WESH.coM, Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.wesh.com/news/17432965/detail.html?rss=orl&psp=
news.
182. Herdy, supra note 181.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. If a pattern of selective enforceability is demonstrated, the association may
not be able to enforce that regulation. Chattel Shipping & Inv., Inc. v. Brickell Place Condo.
Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Wlhen selective enforcement has in
fact been demonstrated, the association is said to be 'estopped' from applying a given regulation." (citing White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 352 (Fla. 1979))).
186. McDaniel, supra note 181.
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its construction were inconsistent with other houses in the neighborhood.187
Although the homeowners' association threatened litigation should the
homeowner fail to rectify the inconsistencies, it is not clear whether the
community's recorded CC&Rs addressed the architectural or aesthetic
scheme allegedly violated.'88 The compassion any reasonable person would
have for the homeowner in the face of such a tragic accident seems to shroud
the fact that he violated the architectural covenant-presuming the CC&Rs
addressed the issue-while simultaneously depicting the homeowners' association, whose job it is to enforce these covenants, as callous and coldhearted.189
Just down the Atlantic coast in Jupiter, Florida, a condominium association' 90 recently passed a rule requiring residents who own dogs to pay a $200
fee.' 91 The purpose of this fee seems quite bizarre: It will pay for dog DNA
sampling, testing, and registration of each owner's dog's DNA profile, and
help defray the cost of pet waste cleanup.192 Faced with the recurring issue
of feces and urine "in elevators, in stairwells, on carpets and in the lobby, as
well as [the] common areas outside" resulting in a $10,000 to $12,000 annual
cleaning and repair expense, the association considered this approach its best
option. 93 Carrying with it the threat of a $1000 fine-and a property lien in
the event of nonpayment-for those owners whose dog's DNA matches
samples of feces collected in these areas, the regulation has been criticized
by many owners.' 94 Legitimate or not, the press-induced awareness of these
types of regulations feeds the stereotype that associations and their boards
are too cavalier with their rule-making power.'95

187.

Id.

188. See id. This is important because it concerns the enforceability of the restriction. See
supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
189. See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 133, at 1136 ("[Homeowners' association] boards
have the capacity to proceed vigorously and even arbitrarily against dissenters, rule-benders
and rule-breakers of both good and bad faith.").
190. While an in-depth analysis of condominium associations is beyond the scope of this
article, it suffices to say they function very similarly to homeowners' associations. See HOA
TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 3.
191. Bill Dipaolo, DNA Samples Will Determine If Jupiter Residents Aren't Picking up
Behind Their Pooches, PALM BEACH POST, June 29, 2011, http://www.palmbeachpost.
com/news/dna-samples-will-determine-if-jupiter-residents-arent-I 568967.html.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 133, at 1136 ("[C]oupled with too many rules and
too few checks on the rulers," homeowners' associations boards superfluously "use missiles to
kill mice.").
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Concerning another aspect of the community makeup, many Florida
communities cater to senior adult living,'96 restricting ownership and occupancy to adults fifty-five years of age or older.'97 This type of community is
desirable for retirees, though "[pireserving the common scheme and continuity for a senior adult community necessitates the enforcement of age restrictions that prohibit children from becoming permanent residents in the community."' 98 While a restriction barring children from residing in the community would be unconstitutional if arbitrarily enforced,'" the FHA provides
that a community may do so subject to certain limitations. 20 0 As with any
restriction, there are always those few who end up between a rock and a hard
place. In a Clearwater, Florida age-restricted retirement community, a young
girl was living with her grandparents because her mother was unfit to care
for her.20 ' However, the community's CC&Rs dictated that no person
younger than fifty-five may live in the community. 20 2 Accordingly, the association brought an action to evict the young girl as a measure of enforcing
the restrictive covenant.203 While it appears a deal between the grandparents
and the association to allow the girl to remain in the household under some
obscure temporary zoning exemption may be imminent,20 it is nevertheless a
painful reminder of the difficult decisions homeowners' association boards
must make and the unfortunate circumstances that can result from enforcing

196. See, e.g., Florida Active Adult Communities, RETIREMENT LIVING INFO. CTR., http://
www.retirementliving.com/florida.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (listing hundreds of adult,
retirement, and senior age-restricted communities in Florida).
197. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 97.
198. Id.
199. White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1979) ("[A] restriction against residency by children under the age of twelve . . . is not constitutionally prohibited
unless unreasonably or arbitrarily applied.").
200. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 97. For example, a community may restrict its
residents to persons sixty-two years of age and older if that is its intent, or it may restrict residents to fifty-five years of age and older so long as "at least 80% of the parcels are occupied
by at least one person [fifty-five] years of age or over." Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2) (2006)
(a provision of the FHA); FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4)(b) (2011) (employing language virtually
identical to the FHA).
201. See Stefanos Chen, The Minor Threat: Age-Restricted Communities Evicting Children, AOL REAL EsT. (Jan. 6, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2012/01/06/theminor-threat-age-restricted-communities-evicting-children.
202. Retirement Community Fights to Evict 6-Year-Old Girl, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 21,
2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/21/retirement-community-figh-n-328396.
html.
203. See id.
204. Chen, supra note 201.
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restrictive covenants in emotional situations.205 What must necessarily be
factored into this equation are the rights of the other residents in the community to enforce the restriction by which they freely contracted to abide, and
those rights are considerably important.20
Homeowners acquiesce to many of these aesthetic and communitymakeup restrictions at the expense of certain liberties otherwise protected by
the First Amendment. 207 These are significant because they may apply both
to owners' parcels and common areas, though Florida offers certain protections to use of common areas involving freedom of assembly and expression:
"The right of a parcel owner to use the common areas includes the right to
peaceably assemble in the common facilities and the right to invite public
officers or candidates for public office to appear and speak on the common
facilities."208 While the Supreme Court of the United States has addressed
the issue of political speech in the form of political signs on a homeowner's
property in violation of a municipal ordinance-which the Court found to be
unconstitutional-its holding does not apply to homeowners' associations
because their conduct does not amount to state action. 2 9 An illustration of
free speech restriction in action comes from the City of Coral Springs in
south Florida, where a homeowner whose community was governed by a
homeowners' association displayed a magnetic American flag and the words
"God Bless America" on his garage door. 2 '0 Because his community's
CC&Rs prohibited the display of signs of any type without prior approval,

205. See Retirement Community Fights to Evict 6-Year-Old Girl, supra note 202 ("[T]he
president of the homeowners' association looks positively gleeful as he discusses the prospect
of getting sheriffs to forcibly remove the small girl."). While the board president may have
been less than compassionate, he has a duty to the other residents to enforce the rules and
regulations that attracted them to the retirement community. See id. Recognition of this duty
often gets lost in the emotionally-charged media rendition of the story. See id.
206. See infra Part IV.A.
207. Coon, supra note 86, at 24; Fleming, supra note 88, at 583. Absent state action,
private individuals may covenant to mutually restrict First Amendment rights such as freedom
of speech and other political expression. Coon, supra note 86, at 24; Fleming, supra note 88,
at 583.
208. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 75.
209. Lisa J. Chadderdon, Note, No PoliticalSpeech Allowed: Common Interest Developments, Homeowners Associations,and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J.LAND USE & ENvt.
L. 233, 240-42 (2006) ("Purely private conduct, absent state action, is not subject to the First
Amendment's protections."); see, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994); Coon,
supra note 86, at 24 ("The most significant hurdle in establishing and vindicating free speech
rights for private community residents who want to post political signs on their property is the
state action requirement for all constitutional claims.").
210. Lisa J. Huriash, Coral Springs Homeowners Association Orders Cop to Remove His
'God Bless America' Sign, TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Aug. 28, 2010.
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the association demanded that the homeowner remove it. 2 1 1 While such a
patriotic sign may emblemize the essence of America, the rules to which the
homeowner covenanted prohibiting any type of signs cannot be undermined
by the content of that sign, and selective enforcement will always be the
danger of acceding to one type of sign over another.212
Another area of controversy may come as a surprise after reading the
FHA protections, which apply to both public and private actors.213 Among
other things, the FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion "in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith."214 However, issues
may arise with religion-neutral restrictions, which do not favor one religion
over another, but rather espouse a religion-free environment. 215 Because this
has not been found to come within existing statutory protections, and judicial
interpretation of the state action doctrine does not, and should not, permit
characterization of the conduct of homeowners' associations as state ac1
216
tion,26 the legislature seems to be the only means of change.217 For example,
in a recent Florida case, condominium unit owners brought an action for declaratory relief and to enjoin a condominium association-imposed ban on the
use of common areas, which included an auditorium being used to hold reli2 19
gious services.2 8 The court held that the owners' right to assemble is not
absolute, and that "the statute itself permits the reasonable regulation of that
right." 220 It found that the association's ban on religious practice in common
areas was a reasonable regulation of that statutory right. 22 1 This holding
211. Id.
212. Id.; DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 96 (discussing the importance of uniform
enforcement and the consequences of selective enforcement).
213. See generally42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
214. Id. § 3604(b).
215. Angela C. Carmella, Religion-FreeEnvironments in Common Interest Communities,
38 PEPP. L. REv. 57, 58 & n.9 (2010); Brower, supra note 15, at 219 ("[R]estrictions on the
transfer of units have limited some prospective purchasers to persons compatible with the
current social, racial, religious, moral, or philosophical composition of the community.").
216. See infra Part V.
217. Carmella, supra note 215, at 58.
218. Neuman v. Grandview at Emerald Hills, Inc., 861 So. 2d 494, 495-96 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2003).
219. See id. at 498. "No entity or entities shall unreasonably restrict any unit owner's right
to peaceably assemble or right to invite public officers or candidates for public office to appear and speak in common elements, common areas, and recreational facilities." FLA. STAT. §
718.123(l) (2011).
220. Neuman, 861 So. 2d at 498.
221. Id.; see also Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n,
456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (finding prohibition of religious services in
common areas did not violate the FHA because access to common areas was not denied for
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highlights the ability of a homeowners' association to promote the best interests of the community as a whole, and that regulation of religious practice in
common areas may serve that collective interest.222
As a result of their decision to voluntarily covenant to abide by a community's CC&Rs, homeowners have a vested expectation 223 that such restrictions will be followed and enforced. 224 They moved into a CIC with the desire to restrict many aspects of the community in order to maintain its attractive aesthetic appearance,225 and to protect, further, and support their "investment-backed expectations."2 26 After all, such rules and regulations "create and maintain the atmosphere and lifestyle that attracted the[se] residents
in the first place."227 In fact, 82% of homeowners believe they receive a favorable return on their investment.228 If these residents desire to enjoy their
neighborhood unblemished by signs dotting every lawn expressing various
political or religious views, or to be free from being subjected to religious
practice in common areas, why jeopardize their ability to contract away those
rights in the name of state action at the expense of their freedom of contract? 22 9 While there will always be situations where restrictions end up
harming a handful of residents, for the countless others eager to enforce
them, it is not fair or equitable to waive them for one person. Such selective
enforcement could lead to a court declaring the covenant unenforceable,
thereby destroying the vested expectations and investments of all the other
homeowners in the community. 230

other purposes and the prohibition applied evenly to all residents of all religions as a total
exclusion).
222. See Carmella, supra note 215, at 64 ("CIC residents who want to live in a religionfree environment . .. may have the general right to expect the absence of ... visible religious
symbols and religious uses. They might consider the public manifestation of religion to be
ugly, messy, offensive, divisive, discomforting, or even threatening.").
223. See infra Part IV.
224. See supra Part II.B.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
226. Brower, supra note 15, at 205; see also Paula A. Franzese, Privatizationand Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and the Rise of Governmentfor "the Nice", 37 URB.
LAW. 335, 342 (2005) (considering "at least [sixty-four] percent of Americans invest all that
they have into the purchase of a home, the stakes are high indeed.").
227. Evelyn C. Lombardo, Comment, A Better Twin Rivers: A Revised Approach to State
Action by Common-Interest Communities, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 1151, 1151-52 (2008).
228. CMTY. Ass'Ns INsT., supra note 94, at 6.
229. Characterizing the conduct of homeowners' associations as state action would jeopardize their ability to enforce covenants restricting free speech or religious practice because
they would then be subject to the Constitution. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see
also infra Parts IV-V.
230. See DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 96.
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The Homeowners' Association: A Necessary Mechanism

With budget shortfalls, the decline in provision of municipal services
gives rise to an increase in popularity of homeowners' associations. 231
Where municipalities are unwilling or unable to provide services desired by
homeowners, a private entity steps in to do just that.232 Where public police
presence can fall short of homeowner expectations, homeowners' associations can provide an increased sense of security that gates out crime and employs private security officers to offer a safer community. 233
As a remedial measure, CIC homeowners "employ [homeowners'] associations to correct the deficiencies and abuses, as they perceive them, of
public governments," thereby compensating for the inadequate provision of
services by cities and municipalities.234 The desire for supplanting governmental control in their communities is evident: 87% of homeowners in governed communities do not want more governmental control over their association.235 Overall, residents are satisfied with the services homeowners'
231. See David L. Callies & Adrienne I. Suarez, Privatization and the Providing of Public
FacilitiesThrough Private Means, 21 J.L. & PoL. 477, 477 (2005) (describing the privatization of services formerly provided by local governments as the result of budget shortfalls);
McKENZIE, supra note 18, at 11 ("[F]inancially strapped local governments . . . found [community association governed] housing appealing because it had features of private infrastructure, allowing communities to grow and add property-tax payers at reduced public cost.");
Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1177, 1238
(1982).
232. That private entity, the homeowners' association, can provide these services through
collection of assessments that are in addition to property taxes homeowners would normally
pay to a city or municipality. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. Po' y 479, 490 (2009) ("As private developers became willing
and able to handle infrastructure that traditionally was provided for by government-laying
out streets, burying sewer lines, fixing street lights, and collecting garbage-local governments discovered that it was financially beneficial for them . . . that these expensive tasks be
performed by the ... [homeowners' association].").
233. See Callies et al., supra note 42, at 181-82 (noting that gating out nonresidents can
provide a sense of security and safety, and that "private [security] officers outnumber public
police officers three to one." (quoting John B. Owens, Westec Story: Gated Communities and
the Fourth Amendment, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1127, 1129 (1997) (internal quotations marks
omitted))); Callies & Suarez, supra note 231, at 492 ("CICs promise privacy, exclusivity, and
the perception of safety."); Pehia, supra note 42, at 327 (observing that homeowners' associations "fill[] [the] perceived gap in [municipal provision of safety and security] service[s] by
employing security guards and constructing entrance gates").
234. Brower, supra note 15, at 205; see also Pehia, supra note 42, at 327 ("[A]s cities
skirted maintenance duties associated with community developments by refusing to accept the
responsibility of the communities' road systems, [homeowners' associations] stepped in as a
necessary private vehicle for providing .. . road and esplanade maintenance.").
235. CMTY. Ass'Ns INST., supra note 94, at 5.
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associations provide.236 While some criticize the privatization of CICs as
resulting in "the possibility that those affluent enough to live in [CICs] will
become increasingly segregated from the rest of society," 2 37 those residents'
tax dollars are not beyond the reach of the local government serving the same
society. 238 Therefore, if anything, CIC residents may be contributing to society at a rate greater than their non-CIC neighbors, because they "still must
pay local property taxes for local government services, whether or not they
avail themselves of such services, and even though they already pay extra for
their private community's services."239
Finally, the homeowners' association, as an enforcing entity, provides
homeowners with economical representation when it comes to enforcing
Even before litigation is contemplated, Florida
restrictive covenants.2'
are statutorily authorized to impose fees 24 1 for
associations
homeowners'
noncompliance and suspend the offender's rights to use common areas and
facilities "for a reasonable period of time." 242 These benefits would not be
realized by a CIC resident not governed by a homeowners' association because his or her only recourse would be to sue the offender to enjoin the violation."

236. See id. at 2.
237. McKENZIE, supra note 18, at 22.
238. Callies & Suarez, supra note 231, at 493.
239. Id.
240. In the sense that in the absence of a governing association, a homeowner in a CIC
with the power to enforce a mutually-restrictive covenant is left with no other remedy for the
breach thereof but a lawsuit against the offending homeowner, the ability of a homeowners'
association to spread the cost of litigation through assessments to all homeowners is an economical way of representing each individual homeowner's interest without the individual
burden of litigation costs. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Mississippi Class Actions and
the Inevitability of Mass Aggregate Litigation, 24 Miss. C. L. REv. 285, 287-88 (2005) (discussing the economic benefits that mass collective litigation provides to groups such as homeowners' associations).
241. So long as the governing documents permit, the association may levy fees of up to
$100 per violation. DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 30, at 94.
242. Id.
243. In the absence of an association acting as an agent of the homeowners for enforcement purposes, a homeowner with the right to enforce a mutually-restrictive covenant is free
to enforce that covenant on a theory of breach of covenant, but must proceed without the
benefits of spreading the cost amongst other homeowners. See Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc.,
186 So. 2d 302, 307 (Ha. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) ("Where the owner of a tract of land subdivides it and sells distinct parcels thereof to separate grantees, imposing restrictions on its use
pursuant to a general plan of development or improvement, such restrictions may be enforced
by any grantee against any other grantee . . . .").
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IV. THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE RIGHT TO RESTRICT THE USE OF
ONE'S PROPERTY
A.

The Freedom of Contract

As a basic premise, freedom of contractW in the real property context
involves the liberal ability of a grantor to deliver to a grantee a bundle of
possessory rights while simultaneously retaining certain lesser, nonpossessory rights." Put more simply, it involves the ability of a property
owner to sell some of his or her property subject to use restrictions such as
"single-family residence only" or "no commercial development" while retaining the power to enforce such restrictions.24 6 The importance of this liberty is embodied in an opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida which recognized, as public policy of the state and nation, the liberal freedom and autonomy one has in the disposition of his or her property. 247 To this end, a
property owner should be free to tailor her property rights and use restrictions as she sees fit, subject of course, to statutory, constitutional, and public
policy limitations.24 8
Concerns about the extent to which this freedom may affect the rights of
residents are evident when considering the consequence restrictive covenants
may have on future owners.249 Because the exercise of "personal autonomy
of some . . . entails joining other like-minded persons in homogenous communities," the result may end up "suppress[ing] the individualism of its
members to preserve the counter-societal nature of the association."250 How244. This is also termed "liberty of contract." See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Watson, 65 So. 2d
732, 733 (Fla. 1953) (en banc). An in-depth discussion of the freedom of contract and its
historical underpinnings is beyond the scope of this article.
245. See Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543.
246. See 21 C.J.S. Covenants as to Use of Real Property § 24 (2006) ("A restrictive covenant is a negative covenant that limits permissible uses of land. The purpose of restrictive
covenants is to allow for uniformity in a given, planned development and to maintain or enhance the value of adjacent property by controlling the nature and use of surrounding properties.").
247. Sinclair Ref. Co., 65 So. 2d at 733; see also supra text accompanying note 3.
248. Sinclair Ref Co., 65 So. 2d at 733; see also Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso,
393 So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Restrictive covenants "will not be invalidated absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of public policy, or that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.").
249. Because restrictive covenants run with the land-provided they satisfy parties' intent,
privity, touch and concern, and other jurisdiction-specific requirements-they are enforceable
against successors in interest; or more simply, subsequent grantees. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Real
Covenants § 20 (2005).
250. Brower, supra note 15, at 219.
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ever, notwithstanding these concerns, the law should respect the voluntary
choice a subsequent purchaser makes in purchasing a parcel of land subject
to a use restriction.2 5' Although the initial decision invokes the landowner's
exercise of free choice and control over the property to his or her personal
satisfaction in a manner that may not comport with efficiency or societal
ideals, "[fluture purchasers with notice [of such restrictions] 'buy into' those
expressions of liberty, and these choices are deemed to be theirs as well." 2 52
Other concerns express discomfort with the notion of burdening a parcel
of property with abridgements of certain constitutional rights of residents and
non-residents alike.253 These abridgements may include restrictions on public assembly, 254 the right to free speech and political expression, 255 and the
right to travel. 25 While these restrictive covenants could last perpetually,
they are the product of free autonomous decision making that addresses the
needs and desires of the property owner in an efficient manner, employing
servitudes as that vehicle.257 As one scholar eloquently stated:
[O]ne of the most powerful traditional justifications for freedom of
contract is that we should give people the freedom to make arrangements that suit their individual interests; social welfare improves when we enforce mutually advantageous agreements, and it
suffers if we prevent people from tailoring property rights in ways
that serve their mutual interests. 258
Who are we to interfere with these private agreements tailoring the
rights affecting the use of private property? Recognizing this important freedom is not only "sanctioned by society ... to promote efficiency .. . [and] to
safeguard individual freedom," 259 it also serves to protect against a modern251. Komgold, supra note 21, at 1548. This respect for individual choice is subject to
"overriding public policy consideration[s]." Id.
252. Id. at 1547-48.
253. See David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating
the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 767 (1995) (arguing
that because of community associations, "nonmembers must forfeit their right to live in certain areas, their right to move about freely, their constitutional guarantees of equal protection
and due process, and their right to a fair share of the public fisc.").
254. See supra note 219 and accompanying text; see also Siegel, supra note 42, at 469-70
("restrictling] public assembly on [CIC] streets").
255. See supra text accompanying notes 207-12.
256. Kennedy, supra note 253, at 770 & n.49.
257. See Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543-44.
258. Singer, supra note 2, at 1028.
259. Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contractin the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (1982).
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ized feudal system of oppressive "serfdom." 2 0 In recognizing this autonomy, "[c]ourts now consistently view servitudes as vehicles capable of facilitating the autonomous choices of individuals and enhancing the value of
land."26 1
The freedom to restrict the use of property is already tempered by the
FHA 262 and other statutory protections, and constitutional and public policy
limitations. 263 Legitimate criticisms of the consequences produced by unchecked restrictive covenants having a discriminatory impact on residents
and nonresidents alike were answered by Congress in enacting the FHA to
protect access to housing for racial minorities who were historically discriminated against.264 The FHA provides "a means to redress private acts of
discrimination" in housing matters, and prior versions were modified "by
including more protected characteristics, providing a more expansive and
detailed list of prohibited conduct, and creating an administrative and judicial
enforcement mechanism." 265 FHA moderation lessens the likelihood of discriminatory impact in housing transactions, and the courts will not enforce a
restrictive covenant in discord with its protections, provided the challenger
satisfies the statutory prerequisites. 26
Limiting a property owner's freedom to restrict the use of her property
threatens market efficiency 267 and endangers his or her vested expectations. 26 8
This is because property owners whose CIC properties are burdened by use
restrictions purchased them subject to these restrictions with the expectation
that they will enjoy the corollary benefits. 2 69 Therefore, judicial enforcement
260. Id. A serf is "[a] person in a condition of feudal servitude, bound to labor at the will
of a lord." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (9th ed. 2009); see also Laura T. Rahe, The Right
to Exclude: Preserving the Autonomy of the Homeowners' Association, 34 URB. LAW. 521,
527 (2002) (Americans have revered property rights because, "as the horrors of communist
regimes past and present demonstrate, the elimination of private property means the destruction of other liberties.").
261. Fennell, supra note 15, at 837.
262. See supra text accompanying note 138.
263. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
264. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants
Underthe FairHousing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (2008).
265. Id. at 29.
266. In order to proceed with an FHA housing discrimination claim, a plaintiff must prove
either "disparate treatment or disparate impact." Angel M. Traub, Comment, The Wall Is
Down, Now We Build More: The Exclusionary Effects of Gated Communities Demand Stricter Burdens Under the FHA, 34 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 379, 396 (2000).
267. See Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543-45.
268. See Randolph, Jr., supra note 16, at 1085 ("[T]here are clearly expectations that
[property] owners have when they invest.").
269. See id. at 1105.

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

33

Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 6

NOVA LAW REVIEW

588

[Vol. 36

of these restrictive covenants should continue unhindered, save for those
falling within statutory and public policy considerations, because "[p]eople
will not likely enter such efficiency maximizing transactions unless they are
confident that the legal system will enforce them."270 Further advancing this
view, one scholar warns of the dangers of restricting the freedom of contract:
From both the libertarian and efficiency point of view, there
seems to be nothing to gain (and a lot to lose) by limiting freedom
of contract or freedom of disposition. Restrictions on disaggregation of property rights can only decrease freedom and well-being
by preventing individuals from entering mutually beneficial arrangements. And anyone who wants to reassemble a fee simple
(full ownership rights) can simply bargain with the owners of each
of the sticks, just as one could try to buy four contiguous parcels of
land to develop a large project. 271
In undertaking the purchase of real property, the individual homebuyer
is in the best position to determine which rights he or she wishes to acquire
and forego, and in the absence of extreme overriding considerations, the law
should refrain from interfering with one's freedom of choice.272
B.

The Right to Restrict the Use of One's Propertyand the FirstAmend-

ment: Hypocrisy by Analogy

The Supreme Court of Florida observed "that the right to own, use, occupy, and dispose of property is a privilege guaranteed to a citizen."273 As
discussed, property owners in a CIC may, and often do, restrict their free
speech as a tradeoff for creating and maintaining the community image they
so desire.274 As controversial as that may seem, there are many other acceptable means of contracting away one's right to free speech.275 In everyday
transactions, people enter into "contracts of silence" 276 such as confidentiality

See Komgold, supra note 21, at 1545.
Singer, supra note 2, at 1024.
Korngold, supra note 21, at 1548.
Harris v. Sunset Islands Prop. Owners, Inc., 116 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1959).
See supra text accompanying notes 207-12.
See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: ContractLaw and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 268 (1998) ("In a legal regime that provides for freedom of contract,
parties are generally free, absent public policy or First Amendment restraints, to commit to
being silent about almost anything.").
276. A "contract of silence" is a "contract in which a party has made an enforceable promise to keep quiet about something." Id. (footnote omitted).
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
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agreements, 277 non-compete agreements, 278 agreements containing employee
"gag" provisions,279 agreements "protect[ing] privacy and reputational interests," 280 and government confidentiality agreements 28 1 "in exchange for some
valuable benefit." 2 82 As a seeming contradiction, some commentators condemn the ability of a CIC to mutually restrict property owners' First
Amendment rights while paying no attention to those agreements in other
contexts.283 So why, then, can individuals restrict their First Amendment
rights in some, but not all, areas of free contract? In either context, the exchange is freedom for benefit, and it is difficult to discern much of a difference. Homeowners restrict their rights to certain First Amendment freedom
of speech protections in exchange for the collective benefit that their communities will be more aesthetically pleasing, more desirable to suit their
tastes and preferences, and that their property values will increase as a result. 284 With contracts of silence, individuals restrict their First Amendment
right to free speech in order to protect some pecuniary or confidential interest
in exchange for some economic benefit. 285 While it could be argued that the
277. A confidentiality agreement is "[a] promise not to disclose trade secrets or other
proprietary information learned in the course of the parties' relationship . . . [and is] often
required as a condition of employment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 339-40 (9th ed. 2009).
278. A non-compete agreement involves "[a] promise, usu[ally] in a sale-of-business,
partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the same type of business for a stated
time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer." Id. at 420.
279. Garfield, supra note 275, at 265.
280. Id. at 272.
281. Id. at 274.
282. Cantora, supra note 86, at 424.
283. See Frank Askin, Free Speech, Private Space, and the Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J.
947, 960-61 (1998) (arguing that the lack of access to private CICs for non-resident citizens is
greatly reduced by the Supreme Court of the United States' refusal to extend the state action
doctrine to these communities in the face of "more and more of the nation's residential streets
[that] are now off-limits in private gated communities."); Coon, supra note 86, at 24 ("[F]ew
[community associations] will satisfy the state action requirement, thereby silencing an opportunity for political speech by a growing number of Americans."); Suarez, supra note 12, at
741 ("The loss of speech rights is one of the most severe constitutional deprivations among
free people, yet the courts have limited ability to protect private CIC residents and nonresidents against it."); Chadderdon, supra note 209, at 264 (positing that in the context of First
Amendment rights, "the restrictions imposed by quasi-governmental bodies like [homeowners' associations] do, indeed, today make it harder for millions of citizens to communicate and
express themselves to their neighbors."); Zelica Marie Grieve, Note, Latera v. Isle at Mission
Bay Homeowners Ass'n: The Homeowner's First Amendment Right to Receive Information,
20 NOVA L. REV. 531, 556 (1995) (criticizing a homeowners' association's aestheticsconscious decision to ban satellite dishes as an infringement on homeowners' First Amendment right to receive information).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 223-30.
285. Cantora, supranote 86, at 424; Garfield, supra note 275, at 269.
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potential impact on third parties that arises out of restricting free speech is
greater in the property context than in contracts of silence, the loss of thirdparty access to information as a result of the latter suppresses speech no less
than the former. 8 6 Property as an institution should be afforded the same
independence in contracting as with any other private contract.287 The same
critics who condemn the ability of property owners in a CIC to restrict free
speech rights would undoubtedly covet their right to privately contract away
their free speech rights in a similar contract of silence unrelated to real property.
V.

STATE ACTION AND THE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION: FLORIDA'S
JURISPRUDENCE

The Constitution's explicit distinction between the public sphere 288 and
private property 28 9 is a testament to the notion that it did not contemplate
private conduct as falling within its purview. 29 0 Therefore, as a threshold
issue, state action is required before the strictures of the Constitutionspecifically the First and Fourteenth Amendments-will apply to private
entities."' This doctrine stands for "the principle that only government actors are subject to constitutional rules."292 This is because "[o]ne great object
286. See Cantora,supra note 86, at 425; Garfield, supra note 275, at 270, 363.
287. See Cantora,supra note 86, at 425.
288. The Constitution addresses Congress in the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits "any State [from] depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
289. The Constitution protects private property rights. U.S. CONST. amend. III (no quartering of soldiers in a private home without the owner's consent); U.S. CONST. amend. IV
("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ."); U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No
person shall be . .. deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
290. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) ("Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment
scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not." (citations omitted)); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent
the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have become involved in it."); Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[T]he action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.").
291. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13; Coon, supra note 86, at 24.
292. John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 569, 573 (2005).
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of the Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private relations as
they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law."293
We subject states and local governments, such as cities and municipalities, to the constitutional protections and limitations because of the power
they lawfully possess to coerce and control the rights of their citizens. 294
They have broad regulatory authority that has the propensity to infringe upon
the constitutional rights of these residents whose acquiescence to those
abridgements and choice of residency does not resemble the voluntary nature
of private community association membership. 295 The acts of homeowners'
associations should not be held to the same scrutiny. This is because the
abridgement of rights in a community association is the product of the voluntary exercise of freedom of contract2 96 and its conduct cannot fairly be
deemed that of the states'.297 Indeed, "private autonomy is a fundamental
notion implicit in American law: maintaining a separation of private and
public spheres of activity." 29 8
With important rights and freedoms at stake on both sides of the scale, it
is imperative that fair and careful analysis be given to balancing the rights of
individuals to freely contract away their own rights-and the ability of the
governing homeowners' association to further promulgate rules and regulations consistent with this intent-with the corollary abridgment of constitutional rights that may not be "primarily the product of consumer choice" 299 or
those that affect nonresidents.3 " Whatever balance is struck between these
competing values, one thing remains constant: Absent "an overriding public
policy consideration,"3 0 ' constitutional scrutiny will not interfere with private
conduct without state action.302 In maintaining a focus on Florida jurisprudence and homeowners' associations, this analysis will focus on Florida cases and the state action tests recognized by them. It will then apply them to
293. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
294. See Frank 1. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutationsof "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1977).
295. See id.
296. See supra Parts l.C, IV.A.
297. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); see infra Part V.B-C.
298. Brower, supra note 15, at 217.
299. See Siegel, supra note 42, at 468.
300. See Kennedy, supra note 253, at 761.
301. Korngold, supra note 21, at 1548.
302. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (stating that to
determine whether conduct constitutes state action and is therefore subject to constitutional
scrutiny, courts "ask[] first whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the
exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority; and second, whether the
private party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor."
(citations omitted)).
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the typical homeowners' association and explain why they do not, and
should not, apply.
Florida Cases and State Action Tests

A.

Over the years, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
several tests or theories under which private conduct may constitute state
action and thereby be subjected to the Constitution.303 Although these tests
are known by various names using less than consistent language, one commentator gleaned seven distinct tests from the Court's state action jurisprudence: the "public function" test, the "state compulsion" test, the "nexus"
test, the "state agency" test, the "entwinement" test, the "symbiotic relationship" test, and the "joint participation" test. 304 Aside from the conceptual
mess that the seven potential tests leave for the lower courts, the problem is
further complicated with the inconsistent application of this doctrine: While
some cases expressly address the issue of state action,305 other courts fail to
address the issue or assume state action is present. 306 A few of the tests that
are recognized by Florida courts-and worded as their case law dictateswill now be presented and analyzed.
1.

Judicial Enforcement

The state action doctrine has been held to apply to all branches of government. 307 In the landmark case Shelley v. Kraemer,308 the Supreme Court
of the United States held that state court enforcement of a racially restrictive
covenant prohibiting the sale of a burdened parcel to a person not of the
"Caucasian race" constituted state action, which thereby violated the Equal

Julie K. Brown, Note, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 Mo.
561, 565-67 (2008).
304. Id.
305. See infra Part V.A.
306. Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 463 (Fla. 2002); see White
Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351-52 (Fla. 1979) (analyzing due process and
equal protection claims against a condominium association without specifically addressing the
issue of state action); Latera v. Isle at Mission Bay Homeowners Ass'n, 655 So. 2d 144, 14546 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (ignoring the issue of state action while resolving a homeowner's First Amendment violation claim against a homeowners' association on grounds that
"the right to install a satellite dish" was not a fundamental right).
307. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930) ("The
federal guaranty of due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as through
its legislative, executive, or administrative branch of government.").
308. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
303.

L.

REV.
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 309 While this case serves as
the foundation for the judicial enforcement test, it has been the subject of
differing interpretations. 310 While some courts have interpreted the holding
narrowly as applying only to judicial enforcement of racially restricted covenants,3 ' others have read it more broadly to include judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants involving other constitutional matters.31 2 Notwithstanding this split in interpretation, the dangers of the latter interpretation are apparent: Extending Shelley beyond racially restrictive covenants "would effectively eviscerate the state action requirement because private property
owners, for the most part, enforce their property rights through court actions."313 Because these conflicts have made their way into Florida case law,
they will be discussed in turn.
In Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc.,3' decided eleven
years after Shelley, the Supreme Court of Florida was faced with a similar
task.315 On review of whether to enforce a restrictive covenant prohibiting
the sale of property in a subdivision to any non-Caucasian or Jewish person,316 the court followed the reasoning of Shelley, and recognized that:
When ... a state court on the petition on [sic] one who seeks to enforce such covenants undertakes to inject judicial validity into the
restriction and thereby through the medium of a judicial decree en-

309. Id. at 4-5, 19-21.
310. See id. at 4, 20. Compare Loren ex rel. Aguirre v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1303 (11th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam), Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1]86, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995),
and Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001),
with Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
and Franklin v. White Egret Condo., Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084, 1088-89 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (Mager and Cross, JJ., concurring).
311. See Loren ex rel. Aguirre, 309 F.3d at 1303 ("Shelley has not been extended beyond
race discrimination." (alteration in original)); Davis, 59 F.3d at 1191 ("Shelley ... has not
been extended beyond the context of race discrimination," and "the concept of state action has
since been narrowed by the Supreme Court [of the United States]."); Golden Gateway Ctr., 29
P.3d at 810 ("Although the United States Supreme Court has held that judicial effectuation of
a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action, it has largely limited this holding to the
facts of those cases." (citations omitted)).
312. See Gerber,757 F. Supp. at 1341 (reading Shelley to include judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants involving First Amendment free speech issues); Franklin, 358 So. 2d at
1088-89 (Mager and Cross, JJ., concurring) ("State action is ... a broad concept and the
actions of state courts and of judicial officers performing in their official capacities have long
been regarded as state action.").
313. Golden Gateway Cir., 29 P.3d at 811.
314. 116 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1959).
315. See id. at 623-24.
316. Id. at 623.
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forces the restriction in violation of the rights of the property owners, such action by the state court constitutes state action violative
of the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 317
The court was careful to narrow its holding to the specific facts of the
case, which is consistent with the prevailing view of Shelley.319
In Quail Creek Property Owners Ass'n v. Hunter,320 a homeowner challenged the constitutionality of a restrictive covenant prohibiting the display
of signs of any kind on any property in his subdivision. 321 Relying on a first
district case, the second district followed the lead of Shelley-extended by
Harris-andheld that "neither the recording of the protective covenant in the
public records, nor the possible enforcement of the covenant in the courts of
the state, constitutes sufficient 'state action' to render the parties' purely private contracts relating to the ownership of real property unconstitutional."3 22
Despite this clear, logical extension of Shelley, a later case muddied the
water. In Gerber v. Longboat HarbourNorth Condominium, Inc.,323 a condominium unit owner challenged a restrictive covenant that barred the display of an American flag except on certain holidays as violative of the First
Amendment right to free speech. 324 Although during the pendency of this
case the Florida Legislature amended a statute to permit the display of a flag
and expressly preempt any conflicting restrictions,325 its applicability was
prospective, leaving the court to consider the constitutional issues.326 The
court expressly relied on Shelley while disagreeing with Quail Creek,327 hold318

317. Id. at 624.
318. "All that we here determine is that the original requirement of membership in the
specific exclusion of Jews constituted an illegal and unenforceable restraint on these appellants . . . . As to them the requirement could not be enforced. This opinion is not to be given
any broader interpretation." Id. at 625.
319. See Cantora, supra note 86, at 426 ("[A]lmost all courts and commentators today
agree that the Shelley decision should be interpreted very narrowly."); Siegel, supra note 42,
at 493 ("[V]irtually all courts and commentators agree that the reach of the Shelley doctrine
should be restricted.").
320. 538 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
321. Id. at 1289.
322. Id.
323. 724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 757 F. Supp.
1339 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
324. Id. at 885-86.
325. FLA. STAT. § 718.113(4) (2011).
326. Gerber, 724 F. Supp. at 886.
327. Id. "This Court cannot agree with [Quail Creek's] conclusion that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants is state action and judicial enforcement of covenants
which restrict one's right to patriotic speech is not state action." Id. at 886-87.
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ing that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants contained in a declaration of condominium that prohibited the display of an American flag except
on designated holidays constituted state action, thereby bringing it within the
ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment through which the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech was selectively incorporated to apply to the states.328
On reconsideration, the same court vacated in part on other grounds, and
reaffirmed partial summary judgment as to the issue of state action.329 The
court reiterated its reliance on Shelley, and opined that it "found and continues to find that judicial enforcement of private agreements contained in a
declaration of condominium constitutes state action and brings the heretofore
private conduct within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, through
which the First Amendment guarantee of free speech is made applicable to
the states."330 This extension of Shelley did not enjoy any camaraderie in
later cases or even in other jurisdictions.33 1 Perhaps the most perplexing inconsistency with Gerber's reasoning is its misplaced reliance on Shelley:
While Gerber posits to rely on Shelley's principle that judicial enforcement
of a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action, Gerber found state
action before the state, through its judiciary branch, even acted;33 2 whereas
Shelley overturned an actual judicial decree that enforced the restrictive covenant at issue.333
Recognizing that the issue of whether judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant curtailing First Amendment rights constitutes state action "is
not well settled," M the court in Sabghir v. Eagle Trace Community Ass'n 335

was faced with a homeowner seeking to enjoin his homeowners' association
from enforcing a restrictive covenant prohibiting the display of his political

328. Id. at 886.
329. Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
330. Id. at 1341.
331. See supra note 311 and accompanying text; Loren ex rel. Aguirre v. Sasser, 309 F.3d
1296, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191
(1 Ith Cir. 1995); Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 810
(Cal. 2001); Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass'n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 821-23 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (criticizing Gerber on several grounds: Its reliance on Shelley is unfounded, because
"Gerber found state action before the state acted"; "old-fashioned patriotism, rather than oldfashioned legal reasoning, is the source of the Gerber opinion's persuasive force"; and the
court agreed with Quail Creek, declaring that "Gerber is not good law").
332. See Goldberg, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 822.
333. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20, 23 (1948).
334. Sabghir v. Eagle Trace Cmty. Ass'n, No. 96-6964-CIV-HURLEY, 1997 WL
33635315, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 1997).
335. No. 96-6964-CIV-HURLEY, 1997 WL 33635315 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 1997).
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signs.336 While the facts in this case resembled Quail Creek and Gerber, it is
distinguishable to the extent that the homeowners' association in Sabghir
purportedly relied upon a municipal ordinance barring the display of political
signs in enforcing its restrictive covenant. 337 Relying on this additional variable, the court denied the homeowners' association's motion to dismiss, finding it unwarranted "based upon the mere allegation of no state action.
Whether or not the fact that the homeowner seeking relief was a candidate
for a judicial office played any role in the court's decision to deny the motion
to dismiss on grounds of no state action, the court held that, "[a]t a minimum,
the [homeowner] is entitled to offer proof on the matter." 339
In Loren ex rel. Aguirre v. Sasser,340 a homeowner brought a suit
against her homeowners' association seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a
restrictive covenant prohibiting the display of signs on her property. 341 Apart
from other FHA claims, the focus of the state action issue involved the
homeowners' association's refusal to waive the restriction to allow the
homeowner to place a "For Sale" sign on her property in what she claimed
was a violation of her First Amendment guarantee of free speech. 34 The
Second Circuit implicitly refused to follow Gerber'spurported extension of
the judicial enforcement doctrine, holding that the homeowners' association
was not acting under the color of state law despite the threat of judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant restricting the ability of a homeowner to
place a sign on her property.343 In further recognizing that "Shelley has not
been extended beyond race discrimination," Loren's holding would appear to
abrogate the earlier, divergent Gerber decision, though it did not expressly

do so.34
2.

Public Function

While much of the state action doctrine in Florida's case law focuses on
Shelley and its progeny, the public function test has been expressly recognized by Florida courts as one avenue to finding state action in the conduct

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
309 F.3d 1296 (11 th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1298.
See id. at 1303.
See id.
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of private individuals.34 The public function doctrine34 was originally espoused in Marsh v. Alabama,34 where the Supreme Court of the United
States overturned the trespass conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who was
distributing religious literature on the private streets of a company-owned
town.4 The Court found that the town, while owned by a private corporation, functioned no differently than a public municipality, as it consisted of
"residential buildings, streets [and sidewalks], a system of sewers, [and] a
sewage disposal plant," employed the services of a county sheriff to "serve[]
as the town's policeman," and operated a "business block," which included a
"community shopping center . . . freely accessible and open to the people in
the area and those passing through."3 9 In Hudgens v. National Labor Rela-

tions Board,350 the Court read Marsh narrowly, holding that a private entity is
the "functional equivalent of a municipality," for the purpose of finding state
action under the public function doctrine, where it has taken "all the attributes of a town [including] residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a
sewage disposal plant, and a 'business block' on which business places are
situated." 35' This "remains the prevailing federal constitutional standard for
determining whether a private community is the functional equivalent of a
municipality."35 2
In Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n,353 residents of a mobile
home park brought an action against their homeowners' association and its
directors for various alleged violations of their civil rights. 35 4 They proceeded under two different theories of state action: public function and state
involvement.15 The court explained that "[u]nder the public function test,
state action will be found where the functions of a private individual or group
are so impregnated with a governmental character as to appear municipal in

345. See, e.g., Sabghir v. Eagle Trace Cmty. Ass'n, No. 96-6964-CIV-HURLEY, 1997
WL 33635315, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 1997) ("In view of the state action requirement set out
by the Supreme Court, constitutional challenges may only be brought against private organizations where such organizations are performing public functions ..... (citation omitted)).
346. This doctrine is known by various names, including the "functional equivalent of a
municipality theory." Siegel, supra note 42, at 471.
347. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
348. Id. at 503, 509-10.
349. Id. at 502-03, 507-08.
350. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
351. Id. at 516, 520 (quoting Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted)).
352. Siegel, supra note 42, at 474-75.
353. 502 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
354. Id. at 1381.
355. Id.; see infra Part V.A.3 (discussion of state involvement theory).
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nature."5 In a concise opinion, the court concluded that "[a] homeowner's
association lacks the municipal character of a company town." 357 Because
homeowners governed by a homeowners' associations "own their property
and hold title to the common areas pro rata," and homeowners' associations
provide services not as a replacement of, but rather supplemental to, those
provided by cities and municipalities, homeowners' associations do not
"act[] in a sufficiently public manner so as to subject its activities to a state
action analysis."3 58 This case conforms to the prevailing view of the public
function doctrine that a homeowners' association would have to operate all
of the Marsh/Hudgens municipal characteristics in order to consider its conduct state action.359
3.

State Involvement

The third main state action theory recognized by Florida courts is the
state involvement test,3 which draws its roots from a line of Supreme Court
of the United States cases.361 As Brock recognized, "[u]nder the state involvement test, there must be a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged activity such that the activity may be fairly treated as that
of the State itself."362 In considering the residents' second state action theory, the Brock court found that "the association's maintenance, assessment,
and collection activities are not sufficiently connected to the State to warrant
a finding of state action."363 Despite extensive state law regulating the activities of homeowners' associations,6 the court found insufficient state in-

356. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1381.
357. Id. at 1382.
358. Id.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 345-52.
360. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1381.
361. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (holding that state regulation of private utility companies was not sufficient state involvement as to constitute state
action); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-73 (1972) (holding that the granting of liquor license does not translate private group's discrimination into state action because,
"where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have 'significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations."' (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380
(1967))); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961) (holding that the
state was sufficiently and significantly involved in discrimination by its restaurant lessee,
which refused to serve a black patron).
362. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1381 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357).
363. Id. at 1382.
364. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 720 (2011).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss3/6

44

Levine: This is my Castle: On Balance, the Freedom of Contract Outweighs

2012]

THIS IS MY CASTLE

599

volvement, "either directly or indirectly," to fairly attribute the acts of the
homeowners' association to those of the state.365
B.

Application

In applying these three tests to the traditional homeowners' association,
it becomes apparent that its conduct cannot fairly be said to qualify as state
action. First, under the judicial enforcement test, Shelley's impact on Florida's jurisprudence and its evolution thereof suggests that Florida courts
view the enforcement of restrictive covenants as not constituting state action.366 This reading of Shelley does not commit the enforcement by homeowners' associations of restrictive covenants to state action designation absent the threat of enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.367 A broader
reading proffering a contrary view would threaten the ability of private individuals to contract to restrict the use of property.368 Even more alarming,
such a reading "would obliterate any public-private distinction and open up
nearly every private action to constitutional restrictions as state action merely
because private actions can and will be enforced by state judiciaries." 369
Therefore, because courts will inevitably be called upon by homeowners'
associations to enforce restrictive covenants, "Shelley is of limited use for a
precedent-based, stare decisis application" to cases involving homeowners'
associations.70 Because Shelley never contemplated judicial enforcement to
extend beyond the context of racially restrictive covenants, to find otherwise
would result in "other constitutional values involving private contracts [to]
be forsaken."37 1 After all, what significance remains in a private covenant
restricting the use of land absent the power of judicial enforcement?
Second, under the public function test, Florida courts have provided a
clear and simple answer: Homeowners' associations simply lack the traditional characteristics one would attribute to a city or municipality.372 While
some argue that the increased privatization of municipal services by CICs is
within the concerns Marsh had in finding a company-town a state actor, 37 3 it
365. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1382.
366. See supra Part V.A.1.
367. See id.
368. Cantora, supra note 86, at 426.
369. Id.
370. Mark A. Rogers, Comment, Community Association Law: Administrative Law as a
Solution by Analogy, 53 EMORY L.J. 1457, 1473 (2004).
371. Id.
372. Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n, 502 So. 2d 1380, 1381-82 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
373. See Siegel, supra note 42, at 541.

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

45

Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 6

600

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

is difficult to fit CICs and those associations governing them within this
analogy.374 Brock explains that the provision of these services does not replace those provided by municipalities, but rather supplements them. 3 75 Indeed, that homeowners' associations may and often do provide and control
utilities also supplied by local government, does not propose to translate that
activity into a public function. 6 In addition, homeowners' associations possess powers that are less intrusive and less extensive than those possessed by
Furthermore, "governments are distinguished
state and local governments.
by their acknowledged, lawful authority-not dependent on property ownership-to coerce a territorially defined and imperfectly voluntary membership
by acts of regulation, taxation, and condemnation, the exercise of which authority is determined by majoritarian and representative procedures."378 These factors demonstrate the difficulty in analogizing homeowners' associations to local government.379
Finally, under the state involvement test, Brock tells us that statutory
regulation of homeowners' associations is not state involvement significant
enough to signal the state action doctrine.380 Aside from statutory regulation,
"there is no other significant connection between states and [homeowners'
associations]." 3 8 1 Certainly, statutory regulation that provides homeowners'
associations with certain authority cannot be viewed as a state delegation of
powers "that have traditionally been associated exclusively with sover-

eignty. ",382

This deficient analogy that fails to liken the acts of homeowners' associations to those of the state is consistent with the current state of the law in
Florida.383 According to an expert with over thirty years of experience practicing community association law in Florida, "[t]he law does not consider
there being state action in association affairs, no matter what test is being

374. See, e.g., Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1381-82.
375. Id.
376. Cantora, supra note 86, at 425.
377. Ellickson, supra note 86, at 1523.
378. Michelman, supra note 294, at 1167.
379. See Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1382; Cantora, supra note 86, at 425; Ellickson, supra note
86, at 1523; Michelman, supra note 294, at 1167.
380. Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1382.
381. Cantora, supra note 86, at 426.
382. Id. at 425.
383. Telephone Interview with Jay Steven Levine, Founding Att'y, Jay Steven Levine
Law Grp. (July 19, 2011). Mr. Levine has been practicing community association law for
over thirty years and runs his practice out of multiple offices, the main of which is located in
Boca Raton, Florida. Id.
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used. This is also the prevailing view of most attorneys in this area of practice.""

C. Why Quasi-GovernmentalStatus for Homeowners' Associations is
Dangerous
As it stands, under the current state action tests, the acts of homeowners' associations remain without state action designation. 8
In response,
some commentators propose a per se rule that would characterize homeowners' associations as a new form of government, classifying them as "quasi386 n
hrb
governmental" entities, and thereby subjecting their conduct to the Constitution and its protections and limitations.8
However, such an extension of the state action doctrine would be dangerous. Because such a proposition would submit the acts of homeowners'
associations to the state action doctrine, the result would intrude upon the
rights of homeowners to covenant for the restriction of property rights in a
CIC and frustrate the homeowners' association's ability to regulate and enforce them.388 It would strip any meaning from restrictive covenants, and
essentially, the freedom of contract.3 8 9 This strongly militates against such a
per se rule. 390 As an alternative, one commentator proposed a multi-part state
action balancing test, which necessarily takes into consideration many pertinent factors relevant to the nature and operation of CICs and homeowners'
associations.39 1 Concededly complex,39 this unwieldy test, if adopted by

384. Id.
385. See Cantora,supra note 86, at 425; Rahe, supra note 260, at 546 ("[F]uture litigation
will determine when, and if, a homeowners' association becomes a state actor.").
386. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 253, at 763 (suggesting community associations are
quasi-governmental in nature).
387. See MCKENZIE, supra note 18, at 135-36 (advocating that homeowners' associations
function as private governments); see also Kennedy, supra note 253, at 764 (advocating a per
se classification treating homeowners' associations as state actors); Siegel, supra note 42, at
561-63 (arguing for recognition, under a complex multi-factor test, of homeowners' associations as state actors in order protect the constitutional rights of their residents).
388. See e.g., Siegel, supra note 42, at 469-71. For example, as private actors, community
associations may restrict First Amendment rights, including the ability "to impose a ban on
posting signs inside or outside a home, to restrict public assembly on their streets, [and] to
prohibit the distribution of newspapers on their streets." Id. at 469-70 (footnote omitted). By
classifying homeowners' associations as a new form of government, these restrictions would
likely violate First Amendment rights protected by the Constitution and therefore be invalid.
See id. at 469-71.
389. See id.
390. See id. at 469-70.
391. See Siegel, supra note 42, at 555-57. These factors include:
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courts, would likely "breed uncertainty and inconsistent rulings across the
state" as well as "substantially increase the cost of litigation."9 Addition
ally, "[p]ractitioners won't be able to advise their clients with any confidence
as to whether they are outside or inside the parameters of this test." 394
VI.

CONCLUSION

Private contracting autonomy involving the creation of, and subsequent
voluntary acquiescence to, restrictive covenants should not yield to the strictures of the Constitution. Neither should the homeowners' association's ability to enforce these covenants be impaired by characterizing such conduct as
state action merely because the same would be an unconstitutional abridgment of rights if performed by state or local government. These private contracts are the product of voluntary market transactions whose regulation is
sufficient under current statutory and public policy considerations.3 95 Aside
from well-established restrictions on the freedom of contract such as FHA
protections and the unwillingness of courts to enforce racially restrictive
covenants, if courts were to impose limitations in other circumstances, how
would such a restriction be administered? To what extent would we erode

1. The nature and extent of RCA property, including the number of housing units; housing
tenure; and the ownership of streets, facilities, and real estate: Does the RCA encompass a
substantial tract of land that incorporates streets and other infrastructure?
2. The nature and extent of RCA services to RCA residents, including street cleaning, trash
collection, snow removal, street repair, sewage treatment, park administration, and security:
Are these services a supplement to municipal services or a substitution for such services?
3. The nature and extent of RCA authority over RCA residents: Does the RCA exercise comprehensive land-use powers over a substantial number of landowners such that the land-use
scheme is the functional equivalent of municipal zoning? Does the RCA levy and collect
mandatory assessments on real property that amount to the functional equivalent of municipal
real estate taxes?
4. The availability of comparable non-RCA housing in the local housing market: Is the choice
to live in an RCA truly voluntary?
5. The local government in-kind contributions of services to RCAs or local government contributions of taxpayer funds in connection with RCA services: Are the contacts between government and an RCA so pervasive as to warrant a finding of state action even if the RCA otherwise were deemed not to be the functional equivalent of a municipality?
6. Nonresident access to RCA property: Does the RCA hold open portions of its poperty [sic],
such as streets, retail establishments, or common areas, to members of the public?

Id. (footnotes omitted).
392. Id. at 558. However, the author hedged this concession by referencing several other
valid tests relating to constitutional doctrine which are similarly complicated but are nevertheless applied by the courts. Id. at 558-60.
393.
394.

Telephone Interview with Jay Steven Levine, supra note 383.
Id.

395.

Korngold, supra note 21, at 1543.
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such an important liberty in the name of protecting rights voluntarily
abridged in exchange for other benefits?
Classification of homeowners' associations as per se quasigovernmental entities whose conduct is subject to the state action doctrineand accordingly the Constitution-would threaten the enforceability of restrictive covenants, rendering meaningless even those most desirable.396 In
deed, such a proposition would entail "transferring property from the private
sphere to the public . . . result[ing] in the . . . deprivation of Americans'

property rights."397 It would also result in an exponential increase in litigation; countless suits for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief would
result because those covenants restricting free speech would then become
unconstitutional as enforced by the homeowners' association.39 ' The homeowners' association would lose its efficacy in enforcing covenants, supporting homeowners' expectations, and protecting their investments should its
conduct be characterized as state action.
As to private restrictive covenants burdening parcels in the numerous
CICs across the country, the state action doctrine largely has no applicability.399 Therefore, as to the homeowners' association-the entity responsible
for enforcing these covenants-the state action doctrine similarly has little
thrust in curtailing those responsibilities. Consequently, the state action doctrine does not, and should not, apply to homeowners' associations. The freedom of contract and the free use of property outweigh a contrary proposition.

396. Chadderdon, supra note 209, at 264; Kennedy, supra note 253, at 763-64, 789-91.
397. Rahe, supra note 260, at 527.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 368-71.
399. Cantora, supra note 86, at 426.
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